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Abstract 
Land taxes are known to be amongst the most efficient forms of taxation since 
land is an immobile factor; property (capital value) taxes are less efficient owing to the tax on 
improvements. However there is little international (or New Zealand) evidence regarding the 
distributional impacts of land and property taxes. Nor is there much New Zealand evidence 
on their potential fiscal implications or about the taxes’ impacts on asset values and debt 
positions. We explore impacts that may arise from a range of land and property taxes that 
differ across certain features (e.g. comprehensiveness and degree of grand-fathering). Both 
partial and general equilibrium models are used. The results provide a basis for considering 
alternative taxation options involving land or property taxes. 
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1  Introduction 
Many developed countries are facing the prospect of significant structural 
central government budget deficits (IMF, 2009). While not affected as badly as some 
countries, New Zealand’s budgetary situation has also turned to deficit (New Zealand 
Government, 2009). These pressures make it sensible to revisit both expenditure 
decisions and revenue-raising options. This paper addresses aspects of the latter, 
focusing on land and property taxes.
1 Some economies raise a material proportion of 
tax revenues by way of land and/or property taxes.  In New Zealand, local 
government raises approximately 60% of its revenue requirements through local 
authority ‘rates’ variously levied on land values or capital values of properties 
(McCluskey et al, 2006). The central government does not employ such taxes, 
although their use has been mooted since at least 1844 when Governor FitzRoy 
attempted (unsuccessfully) to introduce a tax on both land and improvements.
2
We analyse fiscal, distributional and efficiency effects of land taxes and/or 
property taxes. Additional revenues raised through such taxes could be used (and are 
used in our modelling) to reduce other tax revenues, with expenditures being left 
unchanged. Thus we are interested in modelling the effects of a fiscally-neutral 
change to the tax structure. Our analysis covers the effects both of a “land tax” (i.e. a 
tax on land value) and of a “property tax” (i.e. a tax on capital values of property, 
being the sum of improvements plus land value).
 
3
                                                            
1 Hong Kong raises over 35% of government revenue from its property base. The property tax rate is 
currently set at 15% of rental value (less a 20% deduction for maintenance) equating to 0.75% p.a. of 
property value using a net yield of 5% p.a. (Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, 1996; Hong Kong 
Government, 2006). 
 For much of the analysis we will 
be specific about whether we are dealing with a tax solely on land value (a land tax) 
or on total capital values (property tax). In some cases, where we wish to be more 
general, we refer to land/property taxes. Certain variants to basic land/property taxes 
are also explored. 
2 FitzRoy’s proposal was to tax country land (wild or cultivated) at 2d per acre per annum, with a tax 
on houses at a rate of £1 p.a. per room excluding the first three rooms, garrets, outhouses and closets 
(Goldsmith, 2008).  
3 Conceptually, “land value” is best thought of as unimproved land value; i.e. the value prior to any 
drainage, landscaping, etc. In practice, land incorporates some improvements and this may lead to 
taxation of “land improvements” even with a land tax; see Franzsen (2009) for discussion of regimes 
that attempt to tax only unimproved land. In this paper, unless otherwise indicated, we abstract from 
this complication. 2 
In applying the analysis to New Zealand data, we utilise existing valuations 
(rateable values) performed by Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ) for all New 
Zealand properties. These valuations, which already split capital values into land and 
improvement values, have an existing statutory basis and are used currently as the 
base for local authority rates revenues.  
Our theoretical and empirical work is intended as a purely positive analysis 
of the effects involved.  We make no claims that one taxation regime has net benefits 
relative to another; rarely is it possible in public policy to achieve a pure Pareto 
improvement in which no individual is made worse off. We focus instead on 
elucidating a range of impacts that might occur following introduction of a central 
government land/property tax. 
We begin with a brief summary of prior treatments of land and property 
taxes, including previous New Zealand contributions. These contributions can be 
considered in the context of generally recognised properties of sound taxation 
systems, including efficiency and distributional (equity) considerations. We follow 
this summary with a partial equilibrium treatment of the effects of a land/property 
tax on individual land/property values. While the partial equilibrium analysis helps to 
cement key concepts, it ignores system-wide effects that may produce quite different 
results in aggregate. We therefore also adopt a general equilibrium approach to gauge 
economy-wide results of the introduction of a property tax. The general equilibrium 
model, designed to reflect key stylised properties of the New Zealand economy, 
produces some material insights that are not at first apparent from a partial 
equilibrium approach. 
The paper’s empirical work assesses fiscal and distributional impacts 
within New Zealand that might occur following a shift towards land/property taxes. 
Unless otherwise stated, all property values and related data in the empirical analysis 
refer to 2006. In part this is due to data availability, but it is also a sensible precaution 
in an environment where property values first increased and then decreased after that 
date.  
Fiscal implications cover a range of possibilities, depending on the breadth 
of the tax base (e.g. whether the tax is on land or property); whether all land types 
(residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural, forestry, other) are included equally; 3 
whether different rules apply to owner-occupied residential properties or investor-
owned (and/or holiday) properties; whether local authority land and/or “Maori land” 
is included; etc. We use QVNZ valuations to form each of the tax bases wherever 
possible. In some cases, where we wish to estimate the value of a more restrictive 
property definition, we use other estimates of specific values.  Our purpose in these 
calculations is to estimate the quantum of tax revenue that may be raised by certain 
land and property tax variants, which may then be used to reduce revenues from 
existing tax sources (e.g. personal income taxes or company taxes).  
In  order to examine distributional impacts, we utilise two separate 
combinations of data at differing levels of aggregation. In each case, the data relate to 
the household sector, omitting consideration of wider impacts (i.e. we do not 
consider distributional implications of changes in the values of agricultural, forestry, 
industrial and commercial properties). We use census and QVNZ data pertaining to 
territorial local authorities (TLAs) and area units (AU) that enable us to examine 
relationships, at these levels of aggregation, between household incomes, land taxes 
and property taxes. Separately, we use household level data obtained from Statistics 
New Zealand’s Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (SoFIE) to examine 
relationships between property values, household incomes, household wealth and 
other variables that are relevant for distributional considerations. 
2  Context 
Taxation reduces the disposable incomes of those paying the tax in order 
to provide sufficient revenue to meet (central and/or local) government 
expenditures. As well as reducing overall disposable incomes, the design of the tax 
system has distributional impacts and generally distorts economic activity relative to 
activities under a tax-free environment.
4
                                                            
4  Exceptions may occur in cases where the imposition of a tax corrects for a non-existent (or 
insufficient) market price for a good that has real resource costs; e.g. a carbon tax. 
 In light of these effects, several properties of 
‘good’ tax systems are commonly postulated including: allocative efficiency 
(minimising “excess burdens” at each point of time); dynamic efficiency (minimising 
misallocation of resources across time); administrative efficiency and transparency; 
minimising avoidance/evasion; horizontal equity (equal treatment of people in equal 
situations); and vertical equity (tax burden rises as ability to pay increases). 4 
Land taxes are an ancient form of taxation (Dye and England, 2009) and 
have commonly been recognised as meeting at least some of the tests for a good tax 
system. Mill (1865, Book 5, Chapter 2, §5) supported adoption of a land tax, 
particularly one levied on the increment to land values over and above those at a 
fixed point in time. His reasoning was that the increment in land values was due to 
general societal influences and that this increment should therefore form the basis 
for government revenues required for the upkeep of society. George (1880) 
expanded on Mill’s reasoning, and favoured a land tax as a form of taxation that does 
not diminish effort or investment while at the same time taxing private value earned 
from community efforts. The analytical basis for Mill’s and George’s approach was 
rooted in the insights of Ricardo (1817) - and before him the physiocrats - that land 
values impound the rents available to land-owners arising from location-specific 
factors. Modern spatial economics analyses of urban development and the impacts of 
new infrastructure investments on land values embody a related analytical approach 
(Roback, 1982; Haughwout, 2002).  
The favourable allocative efficiency properties of a land tax may be 
illustrated with reference to the principles of ‘second-best’ taxation (Ramsey, 1927). 
In efficiency terms, a first-best tax (e.g. a lump-sum tax) does not alter the structure 
of production, consumption or investment relative to the untaxed economy. In the 
absence of a lump-sum tax,
5 efficiency requires that the tax system be structured to 
reproduce, as closely as possible, the static and dynamic outcomes under a lump-sum 
tax.
6 To meet this criterion, tax rates should be graduated to reflect their impact on 
final allocations. Thus, for efficiency, tax rates should be highest on items that, in 
equilibrium, will have the least change in quantity in response to the imposition of 
the tax. Land can be treated as an item that has (virtually) a completely inelastic 
supply, with the quantity being given by “nature” and so fulfils this criterion.
7,8
                                                            
5 With international migration, even a poll tax cannot be regarded as a lump-sum tax since people can 
migrate to avoid it.   
 
6 Note that this efficiency objective may clash with distributional (equity) considerations, and hence 
policy trade-offs may need to be made. 
7 This statement embodies slight inaccuracies in cases where reclamation is allowed, or where a tax is 
levied only on economic land and some land is allowed to revert to non-economic uses after the 
imposition of a tax (e.g. from marginal farmland to mountain tussock). 
8  Accordingly, Milton Friedman considered that “the least bad tax is the property tax on the 
unimproved value of land” (Blaug, 1980). 5 
The allocative efficiency properties of a land tax do not automatically flow 
through to a property (capital value) tax since improvements (e.g. buildings, walls, 
drainage, etc) are subject to tax under a property tax system, whereas they are not 
taxed under a land tax. Thus the supply of improvements is affected by a property 
tax, resulting in distorted resource allocation (McLeod et al, 2001; p.31).
9
Given the existence of the local authority rating system, a central 
government land/property tax would perform very well in terms of administrative 
efficiency. All valuations required to provide the tax base are already performed and 
taxes (rates) are already levied comprehensively on property owners by two levels of 
government (Territorial Local Authorities and Regional Councils). Thus a central 
government land/property tax could be added as an adjunct to the current system 
with virtually no additional administrative cost. Furthermore, the ability to avoid (or 
evade) the tax is virtually non-existent since the land/property is valued by an 
independent agency and the land/property is available as collateral in cases of non-
payment of tax. 
 
Taxation of land/property would extend the central government tax base, 
not just by taxing an asset that has hitherto not been taxed directly at central 
government level, but also - and more significantly - by taxing non-New Zealanders. 
Foreign owners of land/property would be obliged to pay the tax (as they currently 
do for rates). In practice, as shown in succeeding sections, existing foreign owners of 
land/property at the time of the tax’s establishment would bear the present 
discounted value of the future tax stream.   
One complication of land/property taxes (and of local authority rates) is 
that some households are “property rich but income poor”; this may particularly be 
the case for retired households. In these cases, systems already exist within some 
local authorities whereby rates (tax) payments can be accrued against the value of the 
property, to be met when the property is sold or from the estate.
10
                                                            
9  One consequence is that urban development is likely to be relatively more land-extensive (i.e. 
sprawling) under a property (capital value) tax system than under a land tax system (Oates and 
Schwab, 2009). 
 In these cases, 
10 See: Local Government Rates Inquiry Panel (2007) that stated (p.13): “The rates postponement 
scheme operated by a consortium of councils, which is in effect a home equity release or reverse 
mortgage scheme limited to rates, and the home equity release or reverse mortgage schemes currently 
being provided by private sector financial institutions may assist some ratepayers.” McLeod et al 
 6 
government would accrue the tax owed to it and would fund the lost cash-flow 
through other means (e.g. debt-financing, backed by the accrued tax asset).  
Distributional impacts of land taxes depend on the direct impact of the 
tax, the impacts of other accompanying fiscal changes, and on general equilibrium 
reactions of asset and other prices to the package of tax changes. Plummer (2009) 
reviews international evidence on distributional impacts of a switch between land and 
property taxes, finding that area-specific features are important in determining both 
who gains/loses, and the overall progressivity/regressivity of such a change. The lack 
of consensus concerning distributional impacts of land/property taxes makes a New 
Zealand-specific analysis of the effects important if such a tax were to be considered 
here. We begin such an analysis in this paper. 
New Zealand is an ideal place in which to examine the impacts of land and 
property taxes since the country has a long history of implementing each form of tax 
(Hargreaves, 1991; Dowse and Hargreaves, 1999; Franzsen, 2009). New Zealand 
local authorities were first authorised to levy a property tax in 1844. McCluskey et al 
(2006) document local authority practices with land value and capital value taxes (and 
of taxes on annual rental value, similar in concept to capital value). The Local 
Government Rates Inquiry Panel (2007) found that 56.1% of New Zealand local 
government revenue was sourced from property taxes (of various forms) in 2005/06. 
McLeod et al (2001; p.26) showed that the proportion of taxation raised through 
property taxes was lower in New Zealand than in Australia or the United States. 
Taking into account all levels of government (federal, state and local), Grimes (2003) 
found New Zealand’s share of property taxes in government revenue was relatively 
low, at 5.7%, compared with a (20 country) OECD average of 8.3%. As a share of 
GDP, New Zealand’s property tax share was also relatively low at 1.8% compared 
with the average rate of 2.4%. 
                                                            
(2001; p.28) also noted the importance of such a scheme with respect to cash-flows in relation to their 
suggested Risk Free Return Method (RFRM) of asset taxation.  7 
3  Partial Equilibrium Effects of a Land Tax 
3.1  Outline 
The initial effects of a change in land/property tax rates can be ascertained 
through the use of partial equilibrium models of land/property valuations.
11
Our main focus in the examples that follow concern the effects of a land 
tax rather than a property (capital value) tax for the efficiency reasons discussed 
above. For the numerical examples we use a tax rate of 1% p.a. (e.g. a tax payment of 
$2,000 p.a. for a land parcel valued at $200,000). We analyse one case with a property 
(capital value) tax for comparison. In addition to a flat rate tax on land value, the 
most common form of land tax, we examine two alternatives. The first involves the 
gradual introduction of a land tax over a number of years. Such a tax may be 
considered if the cash-flow impacts of the full immediate imposition of such a tax 
were regarded as problematic. The second involves the taxation of just the increment 
of land value above some starting value, as per the tax structure implied by Mill. This 
option involves several complications, but it is nevertheless still feasible to arrive at 
valuations for variants of this option. 
  We 
analyse a number of separate regimes, providing both general results and specific 
numerical examples. Partial equilibrium calculations, by definition, leave out broader 
economy-wide effects that may affect the market in question (in this case, the 
property market). We provide one example to show the potential impact of such 
feedbacks prior to a more comprehensive general equilibrium analysis in the next 
section. 
3.2  Simple land tax 
Consider the purchase price of a plot of land at the end of year i=0 that 
pays the owner an after-income-tax rental stream of Yi=(1+π)
iY[r,k,t] in years   
i=1, …, ∞, where π is the annual rate of land rent inflation. For simplicity, π is set 
equal to the general rate of inflation unless otherwise specified. Rents may reflect the 
imputed value of the property to the owner-occupier, or may be the explicit 
contractual amount paid by a tenant to a landlord. In general, market rents are likely 
to be a function of the real interest rate, r, the land tax rate, t, and other costs or 
                                                            
11 The analysis here draws on, and extends, that in Oates and Schwab (2009). 8 
benefits associated with the land,  k, which may include local authority rates 
payments, maintenance charges and any expected rate of real capital gain/loss on the 
land. The parameter k is expressed as a ratio of the land value. For simplicity, π, r, 
and k are treated as known, fixed rates. The nominal discount rate is given as 
[(1+r)(1+ π)-1], for which a close approximation is r+π. When the tax rate is t, the 
value of the property at the end of year i is denoted 
t
i V . 
The purchase price of the property at the end of year 0 is given by the 
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Equating terms and solving for V
t
0 gives the purchase price: 
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This expression specifies a general relationship between rents and 
property values, without stating how the level of either is determined. But consider 
an example where Y[r,k,t] is constant, and there is a land plot with initial rent of 
$10,000 p.a., an annual real discount rate of 0.05, a value for k=0.00 (i.e. where 
expected annual costs equal expected annual gains), and with an initial zero tax rate 
(t=0.00). Denoting 
0
0 V  as the tax-free land value, 
0
0 V  = $200,000, while if a 1% p.a. 
land tax (t=0.01) is imposed 
t V0   = $166,667. In general, manipulation of (3) 














0 0                 (4) 
Equation (4) indicates that, given the imposition of a land tax, the 
proportionate change in property values will be more marked: (a) the lower is the 
discount rate, and (b) the lower is k. The latter case may occur where real capital 9 
gains expectations are “high”. These results indicate that the imposition of a land tax 
reduces the wealth of existing land owners if rents do not change. A separate 
question arises as to how it affects the situation of a prospective home-buyer in year 
0. In the absence of borrowing constraints, the effect on such an individual is neutral 
(abstracting from the positive effects of any recycled tax revenues). The reason is that 
the purchase price is reduced by the exact amount of the (discounted) tax payments 
due on the property. In this case (again noting the partial equilibrium caveat) a 
prospective home-buyer’s financial situation with respect to house purchase is no 
different after the introduction of a land tax than before its imposition. 
If the prospective purchaser faces a borrowing constraint, the situation 
may change. First, consider the case where the borrowing constraint is in the form of 
a debt servicing constraint (relative to income). If income is unchanged, the 
imposition of the tax will not alter the severity of the constraint if tax payments are 
included in the servicing constraint. This is again because the drop in interest 
servicing from a lower purchase price is offset against the new tax payments.
12
3.3  Endogenous Rents 
 
Second, consider the case where the borrower is constrained solely by having 
insufficient equity for an initial deposit. In this case, house purchase will be easier 
with the tax since the house purchase price, and hence the deposit (for a given 
deposit ratio), will be reduced. As discussed subsequently, however, the general 
relaxation of this form of constraint may act to raise house prices relative to the level 
shown for the unconstrained case. The general equilibrium analysis of the following 
section analyses these issues in greater depth. 
In general, rents are a function of the tax rate and may change in a step 
fashion upon imposition of a new land tax.
13
                                                            
12 If disposable income rises (as a result of recycled tax revenues) then, ceteris paribus, the servicing 
constraint will be reduced. 
 For instance, the revenue from a land 
tax may be recycled by way of an income tax reduction, in which case disposable 
incomes (prior to property taxes) would rise and people would be able to afford 
13 Other variables, r and k, may also change as t changes, but for simplicity we do not discuss these 
possibilities here. The analysis would follow along similar lines to that of a change in Y. Note that 
relaxation of a deposit constraint, as discussed in the previous sub-section, may be another factor that 
would influence the level of house prices following imposition of a land tax.  10 
more by way of property expenditures as part of their overall consumption budget.
14
We can take account of the general equilibrium effects analytically by 
denoting the new initial rental level consequent on a shift from a tax-free 
environment to one with land tax at rate t as Y[r,k,t] =Y[r,k]Z[t]. Manipulation of (3) 
in this case produces the expression in (5) for the change in land value consequent 
on the introduction of the tax: 
 
A general equilibrium model is required to determine the impact of a change in land 
taxes on the level of rents and property prices, as well as the ratio of the two.  
 
t k r











0 0               (5) 
This result is important when considering the effects of imposing a land 
tax, for it shows how much rents must change for any change in land prices. In 
general, if the new tax revenue is used to reduce other taxes and increase disposable 
incomes, or if the supply of housing is quite elastic, land prices will fall by less than 
suggested by equation 4. Using our previous example (Y=$10,000; r=0.05; k=0.00; 
t=0.01), land prices would not fall if Z were at least 1.2 (i.e. a 20% upward shift in 
rents consequent on the tax). 
3.4  Property Tax 
An analysis of the impacts of a land tax on land prices can be extended to 
an analysis of the impacts of the introduction of a property tax on property prices 
(i.e. on the sale price or capital value of the property). In order to model this 
generally, we allow the tax on land value (t) to differ from the tax on improvements 
(s), and also allow ‘other’ rates of costs or benefits to differ, with rate k for land and j 
for improvements. The latter is particularly important since the costs of 
depreciation/maintenance for improvements is likely to be much higher than that for 
land. The initial annual rental stream from improvements is denoted M. 
                                                            
14 See Grimes and Aitken (forthcoming) and Pain and Westaway (1997) for details of how house 
prices may react in response to a change in disposable incomes. 11 
We denote the year 0 value of the property as H0. Since H equals the value 
of land plus the value of improvements, we can use the same methods as in (1) – (3) 









= 0               (6) 
Assuming no changes in Y or M consequent on the introduction of a land 
or improvements tax (i.e. the partial equilibrium case), we can manipulate (6) to 
examine the effects of tax changes on initial property value. Analytically, the simplest 
case is where t=s and k=j in which case the impact of a change in property taxes 
from zero to t (=s) is given again by equation (4).  
From the discussion following (4) we know that the higher is k or j, the 
smaller is the proportionate change in property price following the imposition of a 
tax. In practice, we expect j>k, possibly for two reasons. The first is that the rate of 
maintenance costs on improvements is likely to exceed that on land. This explanation 
is consistent with current tax schedules which treat depreciation on structures 
differently from depreciation of land. The second is that zoning and/or 
topographical constraints mean that urban land may be in less elastic supply than 
improvements, in which case real capital gains expectations for land for urban uses 
may exceed those for improvements. If it is the case that j>k, the proportionate 
effect on property prices of the introduction of a property tax (with t=s) will be less 
than that indicated by (4). 
We can examine the impacts of the imposition of a land tax only (i.e. s=0) 
on the overall property price. In practice, this will be the chief indicator of impact for 
a property owner. Using the same terminological approach as before, we can 
manipulate (6) to show the proportionate change as: 















        (7) 
If we were to simplify this expression by assuming that k=j, the 
proportionate change in property value from a land tax would be given by: 














            (8) 12 
Equation (8) has consequences for considering the distributional effects of 
a land tax (as opposed to a property tax) amongst existing property owners. The 
proportionate drop in property price that results from a land tax will be relatively 
large for properties with relatively small value of improvements relative to land. In 
other words, land-extensive properties will fall in price by more than land-intensive 
properties. This result is consistent with the result cited in the previous section that, 
on balance, imposition of a land tax is likely to have a limiting effect on city sprawl. 
Analysis later in the paper uses New Zealand data to assess whether the distributional 
effects arising from the result in (8) is likely to result in a progressive or regressive 
outcome (i.e. we analyse whether wealthier households tend to have land-extensive 
or land-intensive property holdings).  
One other consequence of (8) is that land-extensive productive activities 
will bear a proportionately larger fall in property values than land-intensive 
productive activities. This may lead to consideration of differing rates of land tax 
being levied on different land types if policy-makers were concerned about the 
(relative) wealth effects on certain groups of productive enterprises. Section 5 
analyses New Zealand data to see which productive sectors may be most affected in 
this respect. 
3.5  Gradual Tax Introduction 
One issue related to land tax is that existing owners face a new tax stream 
that they had not prepared for (though they may face a reduction in other tax streams 
if the revenue is fully recycled). This may create cash-flow and other issues. One way 
of addressing this issue is to introduce the tax gradually over time. In this case, the 
tax rate becomes a time-varying rate, and is denoted ti. At the general level, equation 















r τ       (9) 
The speed of introduction will affect the degree of price response to the 
tax since an initial ‘grace period’ exists where the land-owner does not meet the full 
long run rate of tax. As an example, take our initial case in which rents are constant 
with Y=$10,000 p.a., r=0.05, k=0.00 and pre-tax V0=$200,000. Again consider the 13 
imposition of a 1% p.a. land tax, but this time with a twenty year linear transitional 
path (thus the initial tax rate is t1=0.0005 and the full rate of 0.01 is reached only in 
year 20). In this case, the value of V0 falls to $176,858, which can be compared with 
the fall to $166,667 with full immediate introduction. 
Thus a gradual introduction of the tax alleviates cash-flow issues for 
existing land-owners in the early years of the tax, and results in a lesser fall in land 
(and property) values than immediate introduction. The counterpart to these 
outcomes is that initial tax revenues raised by the tax are reduced, so there is less land 
tax revenue to recycle in other forms. 
3.6  Incremental Tax Base 
Another approach to alleviating initial cash-flow impacts of the tax is to 
levy the tax only on increments of land value over and above some initial level.
15 This 
approach is consistent with the idea mooted by Mill. It mitigates the potential 
“fairness” criticism that existing owners were not aware of the potential tax liability 
when purchasing the property. By taxing only the increment in property values, the 
tax, in effect, becomes a form of capital gains tax on property.
16
This version of the tax is more complicated to model because even the 
taxation of incremental value will cause the initial land value to fall by the discounted 
amount of the future tax stream. Thus the increment above initial (pre-tax) values 
will disappear for some years until such time as capital gains are sufficient to raise 
land value beyond the pre-tax level.  
 
In order to model this option, we assume that there is some threshold 
level of land value, X, that is not taxed, and that all increments above this level are 
taxed. We assume that X is set such that X≤
t V0 ; thus land values do not fall below 
the threshold value even after the imposition of the (incremental) tax. The expression 
determining land value (with rents fixed at Y) becomes: 
                                                            
15 Alternatively, the tax may be levied only on land values above a specified flat value per hectare 
(where that value is identical across all land). This approach may have progressivity advantages and 
would alleviate the impact on land-extensive activities such as farming and forestry. 
16 Administratively, however, an incremental land tax is far simpler to implement than an accrual 
capital gains tax (which can cause major cash-flow problems in particular years for the taxpayer) and 
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From (11), one can solve for the threshold value that equals the new (lower) level of 
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For our standard example (Y=$10,000; r=0.05; k=0.00; t=0.01) with 
π=0.02, the threshold value becomes $189,189. Thus even though only increments 
above the new land value are taxed, land value still falls by 5.4% given these 
parameter choices. If π=0.04, the threshold value falls further to $183,673, an 8.2% 
fall. Thus as inflation rises, the new market value of land falls, despite only the 
increment to the land value above its new initial equilibrium value being taxed. 
The reason for this result is that the incremental tax considered here is one 
that taxes nominal capital gains, rather than real capital gains. If only real capital gains 
were taxed, (i.e. if the threshold was set so that X=
0
0 V  and indexed at rate (1+π)), no 
tax would be collected on the inflation component. 
3.7  Taxation of “Betterment” due to Infrastructure Improvements 
One situation in which real capital gains may arise is where a specific 
infrastructure investment (or new local amenity) raises local land values (Roback, 
1982; Haughwout, 2002; Grimes and Liang, forthcoming). A related situation is 
where land is rezoned, for instance from agricultural to residential use (Grimes and 
Liang, 2009). The rise in land values in this  situation is sometimes termed 
“betterment”. Betterment can be captured by the infrastructure investor if that 15 
investor owns the land serviced by the new investment
17 otherwise (in the absence of 
taxation or development levies) it accrues to private land-owners who may not have 
funded the investment. In this latter situation, (at least some portion of) betterment 
can be captured by the government if the rise in land values attributable to the 
infrastructure investment is taxed.
18
In order to differentiate this form of tax from the prior example (in which 
the inflation component of land value gains is taxed), we concentrate here solely on 
the taxation of real capital gains. (Formally, this is equivalent to taxing nominal gains 
and setting π=0 in our analysis.) We consider two alternatives. First, we consider the 
effectiveness of a general (real) land tax in taxing betterment values. Second, we 
consider the effectiveness of an incremental (real) land tax for the same purpose. 
 
For the first alternative, assume that initially no land tax is in place and 
that a specific plot of land earns annual rent Y. Based on our past derivations, the 
initial value of the plot is: V0=Y/(r+k). A public infrastructure project is then built 
that raises the annual rental stream to Y* and an annual land tax at rate t is levied; 
thus the new plot value becomes: V0*=Y*/(r+k+t). If the tax rate were set so as to 
capture all the value uplift from the project (so that V0*=V0), the resulting rate 
would be given by: 
Y
Y Y k r
t
) * )( ( − +
=                 (13) 
Based on our previous example (r=0.05; k=0.00) and with (Y*-Y)/Y = 0.1 
(i.e. a 10% rental increase), the required tax rate would be t=0.005 (i.e. ½% p.a.).  
The present discounted value of the tax flow equals tV0*/r. One policy aim 
may be to set this value equal to the per property project cost, P. In this case, the 
resulting rate becomes: 
                                                            
17 For an historical example in New Zealand see New Zealand Government Railways Department 
(1927).   
18 In 1870, Sir Julius Vogel, as part of his massive public works scheme, proposed a small betterment 
tax on private properties that increased in value as a result of the proposed new railway. The proceeds 
of the tax were intended to part-fund the investment. Woods (1935) documents that the proposed tax 
was rejected by Parliament, whose “representatives were, in the main, land-owners.” For a review of 
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In interpreting (14), note that rP is the per property interest servicing cost 
of the project. Again assume that r=0.05; k=0.00 and Y*=$11,000 (=1.1 x Y, where 
Y=$10,000), and consider a project with P=$10,000; hence rP=$500 so that the 
benefit-cost ratio (BCR), defined as (Y*-Y)/rP, equals 2. The resulting t≈0.0024. If, 
instead, P=$20,000 (hence BCR=1), the required t=0.005, consistent with the full 
value uplift case. Generalising, the project can be financed through a flat land tax and 
still leave some value uplift for local landowners provided BCR>1; if BCR<1, full 
financing through a flat land tax will lead to a decline in property values. 
Under the second alternative, only real incremental land value is taxed (at 
rate t). Using previous results, the value of a plot of land that experiences an 













* 0               (15) 
The first term on the right hand side of (15) is the land value prior to the 
rise in rents which remains unaffected by the incremental land tax. The second term 
reflects the rise in land value consequent on the project (and hence the resulting 
rental rise); the tax is levied on this increment at rate t. Thus the present discounted 
value of tax revenue is given by [t(Y*-Y)]/[r(r+k+t)]. The tax rate required to finance 
a project with per property cost, P, becomes: 





t                 (16) 
Equation (16) establishes that an  incremental (real) land tax can fully 
finance a project if and only if the BCR>1. Even then the tax rate may be ‘high’. For 
instance, assuming the same values for r, k, Y and Y* as before but with P=$19,000 
(BCR≈1.053), results in t=0.95. In general, a tax rate of less than unity requires 
BCR>1+r+k. If the BCR is favourable, a more moderate incremental land tax rate 
can result; for instance, with P=$5,000 (BCR=4), t≈0.017. Realistically, therefore, full 
financing of a project through an incremental (real) land tax may be restricted to 
projects with high BCRs. 17 
A real incremental land tax can be conceived as a replacement for a tax on 
real capital gains on land. The latter option taxes the one-off annual capital gain at 
rate c; by contrast, an incremental land tax spreads the tax over time, with an annual 
tax rate of t. We can equate the present discounted revenue from an incremental land 
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For instance (with r=0.05 and k=0.00), instead of a capital gains tax of 
30%, an incremental land tax could be substituted with a rate of 2.14% p.a. Each 
approach would result in 30% of the real capital gain being taxed (in present 
discounted value terms), with the same present discounted revenues accruing to 
government. Cash-flows from an incremental land value tax would differ from a 
capital gains tax since the former would be spread over the indefinite future whereas 
a ‘pure’ capital gains tax is due immediately (within one year) of the capital gain being 
apparent. In many jurisdictions, cash-flow concerns with regard to the taxpayer 
means that the capital gain is only payable on realisation of the property, which 
creates lock-in effects and other complications. These issues are much less 
problematic in the case of an incremental land tax. 
4  General Equilibrium Effects of a Property Tax 
4.1  Outline 
The above equations describe how the ratio of rents to property prices 
depends on the land tax rate and other factors. However, they do not indicate how 
taxes affect the level of either rents or property prices, except under special 
assumptions. Because the distribution and welfare implications of a land tax depend 
on the levels of rents and property prices, not just the ratio of rents to prices, a more 
elaborate approach is needed to examine the wider effects of a land tax.  In general, 
this requires a general equilibrium model in which the level of rents and land prices 
are determined endogenously as a function of other factors such as incomes and 
interest rates. This section presents the results of one such model.   
The model is an extension of the model used by Coleman (2008) to 
analyse the effect of inflation, credit constraints and New Zealand’s tax system on 
the housing market. In turn, it is based on the overlapping generations housing 18 
model of Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998, 2006). The details of the model are 
described in Coleman (2009); the basic structure of the model is a set of equations 
describing the demand for rental and owner-occupied housing, the supply of rental 
housing, and the total supply of housing.   
4.1.1  Demand for owner-occupied and rental housing  
The demand for rental and owner-occupied housing is based on an 
intertemporal utility maximisation model of consumer demand applied to a large 
number of agents who differ by age, income, and wealth. In the model, each agent 
passes through four distinct stages (two young stages, one middle-aged stage, and 
one stage in retirement) before dying.
19
All agents have budget constraints that ensure lifetime expenditure on 
housing and goods is equal to their after-tax lifetime income, adjusted for 
inheritance. The agents can borrow or lend at exogenously determined interest rates, 
although young agents face bank imposed credit constraints limiting the amount they 
can borrow. The credit limits reflect both a minimum deposit requirement on house 
purchase and a maximum debt servicing constraint in relation to current income. All 
mortgages are table mortgages; thus, with a rising income profile over a person’s 
lifetime, the credit constraint is most likely to bind in the earlier years of adulthood, 
and induce young agents to rent rather than purchase.  
  The agents have different exogenously 
determined life-cycle patterns of labour income, they pay tax, save for retirement, 
and have choices over different types of houses and housing tenure at each stage of 
their lives. The agents are assumed to choose their most preferred housing options, 
given their age, wealth and after-tax incomes, the cost of renting or buying different 
houses, their ability to raise a mortgage, and any property taxes. Agents are assumed 
to be forward looking, so when they choose housing in a particular period they take 
into account not only their current income and current housing prices, but their 
remaining length of life, future house prices, their future income stream, and their 
desired future housing patterns. 
The agents choose between four housing options: they can (a) share a 
rental apartment with another agent; (b) rent an apartment without sharing; (c) live in 
                                                            
19 The model can be thought of as pertaining to either a person or a family; we refer to “family” or 
“agent” in the following. 19 
an owner occupied apartment; or (d) live in an owner-occupied house. Utility 
increases as the agent  moves up the quality ladder from (a) to (d). The credit 
constraints mean that agents typically ascend a property ladder as they age, although 
they may trade down in retirement. When agents die, they leave any house they have 
to the younger generation, but otherwise are assumed to run their financial wealth to 
zero by the time of their deaths. In the model, this assumption provides most agents 
with an incentive to rent in the last period of life, whereas in reality the vast majority 
of retired people own their own homes. To match the model with this aspect of the 
real world, agents are only allowed to rent in retirement if they have rented 
throughout the rest of their lives.  
Agents may receive a bequest in addition to leaving one. In the results 
presented below, we have assumed that in middle age each agent receives a bequest 
from someone at the corresponding point in the income scale (i.e. a person at the 
75th percentile in his cohort’s income scale receives a bequest from a person who 
has just died who was also at the 75th percentile in her income scale). The model has 
also been solved under the assumption that each agent faces an even chance of 
receiving a bequest or no bequest, with the size of the bequest, if received, related to 
the agent’s place on the income scale. The results from the two approaches are 
broadly similar and we report the results of the simpler specification. 
Housing choices depend not only on the prices of different sized houses 
relative to rents, the utility gained from living in these houses, and the price of other 
goods, but also on lifetime income profiles, interest rates, and the specifics of the 
bank imposed credit constraints. In the simulations reported here, real interest rates 
are equal to 5 percent; higher real rates typically raise homeownership rates, while 
lower rates lower homeownership rates. Because borrowers use table mortgages to 
raise funds, an increase in the inflation rate creates makes it more likely that credit 
constraints bind; inflation also interacts with the tax system to increase the wedge 
between real borrowing and lending rates when inflation is non-zero. We focus on 
the zero inflation case so as to concentrate on the situation in which inflation does 
not distort outcomes. We have also conducted simulations with a positive inflation 
rate (at 2% p.a.) and the broad nature of the reported results are robust to this 
change. 20 
In the baseline model when the property tax rate is zero, agents face a 
GST rate of 12.5% and a two-step income tax regime with a lower marginal tax rate 
of 20% and an upper marginal tax rate of 33% on current incomes. As the property 
tax rate is varied in the simulations, these rates are adjusted so that the fiscal position 
remains balanced. The exogeneity of agents’ incomes means that we do not allow for 
any production changes as a result of taxation changes. For instance, we do not 
account for any rise in productivity as a result of shifting from an income tax to a 
property tax. Our simulations will therefore understate net benefits of such a tax shift 
if productivity improvements would eventuate from such a tax switch. 
4.1.2  The supply of rental housing  
Rental accommodation is supplied by agents who become landlords. It is 
assumed that the supply of landlords is perfectly elastic, or, equivalently, that entry 
into the rental sector is competitive, so landlords bid for houses and set rents at 
levels that leave them indifferent between the after-tax returns from lending money 
and the after-tax returns from investing in residential property. These returns include 
rents adjusted for costs like rates and any property tax, upon which income tax is 
paid; and capital appreciation, which in this paper is exempt from income tax
20
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the marginal competitive landlord is assumed to be a middle aged agent who is on 
the top marginal income tax rate, equality between the after-tax returns from 
residential property and lending means 
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  Equation 18 has a form similar to equation (3), although is more complicated 
to take into account the different income tax treatment of interest income and capital 
gains. This equation therefore determines the relationship between rents, property 
prices and the rate of property price appreciation, and can be used to derive various 
analytic results about the way that taxes affects the ratio of rents to property prices. 
To a large extent, the rest of the model – the demand for rental and owner-occupied 21 
housing, and the supply of housing – determine the level of rents, property prices, 
and property price appreciation rates, allowing the distributional and welfare effects 
of different taxes to be calculated. 
4.1.3  The supply of housing 
A key factor that affects the results is the housing supply elasticity, the 
extent to which the number of properties (apartments and houses) changes as prices 
change because of new construction. We simulate the model with two contrasting 
assumptions. First, we assume that the housing supply is perfectly inelastic. This 
assumption may approximate the case of a land tax that is levied on all unimproved 
land in the economy. In that case, while the supply of land to housing may not be 
perfectly inelastic, all land will be affected by the land tax and so there is no wedge 
created between housing land and agricultural land, and hence no reason to expect 
land to be reallocated from one use to another
21. Second, we assume that housing 
supply is elastic, with an elasticity of unity at equilibrium.
22  This may be more 
appropriate for cases either where a tax on improvements is being considered (since 
new improvements will be forthcoming as long as the value of improvements 
exceeds the cost of building them
23) or where a land or property tax is imposed on 
housing, with agricultural land taxed at a lower rate (or exempt) and where there is 
some ability to convert land between alternative uses
24. The inelastic supply case is 
closest in concept to the assumptions underlying our partial equilibrium examples 
with exogenous rents.
25
The model does not include land separately from improvements which is 
the reason that we describe the new tax as a property tax rather than as a land tax. As 
discussed above, the inelastic supply case may be closer to a land tax in which all land 
in the economy is subject to the same tax rate. 
 
                                                            
20 Coleman (2009) examines the effect of applying different types of capital gains taxes in this model.  
21 However, where land improvements are taxed, the long run supply of improved land for residential 
purposes may not be perfectly inelastic, especially in the longer term. 
22 This parameter choice is designed to reflect the long run elasticity of dwellings (but not necessarily 
residential land) with respect to population. 
23 Grimes and Aitken (forthcoming). 
24  For instance, pressure may be placed on local authorities to rezone vacant residential land to 
agricultural purposes. 
25 McLeod et al (2001, p.97) draw a distinction between the supply elasticity of improvements and land 
in analysing tax benefits for housing: “in the long term, the supply of housing is highly elastic such 
that marginal home buyers will still capture material tax benefits. The land upon which houses are 
 22 
Under all sets of assumptions, prices, rents, and price appreciation rates 
adjust to ensure there is a steady state equilibrium in the housing market across all 
types of houses and tenure. For a given set of parameters, the equilibrium prices are 
found numerically and are used to calculate the welfare and distributional effects of 
different tax systems. First, we run the model with a baseline set of parameters in 
which GST and income tax rates are set as outlined above, with no property tax. We 
then impose a property tax of 0.5% p.a. on all owner-occupied and investor-owned 
houses.
26
Other tax schemes have been investigated using this model although, 
being a steady state model, the tax on incremental value and the gradual tax 
introduction cases considered in the partial equilibrium analysis cannot be simulated. 
One alternative scheme that we investigated was a property tax with an exemption 
for owner-occupiers. This resulted in the virtually complete collapse of the rental 
market, as the long term costs of renting exceeded the long term costs of home 
ownership. We do not consider this result to be just an artefact of the model; in 
reality, a distortion of this nature could severely impact on renters and could have 
major welfare consequences. 
  In order to ensure fiscal neutrality, we offset the resulting income to 
government by: (a) reducing GST, or (b) reducing income tax. In the latter case, we 
reduce all agents’ income tax payments proportionately.  
4.2  Results: Inelastic Housing Supply 
Initially we examine the general equilibrium effects of a shift in taxes 
under the assumption that the housing (and apartment) supply is perfectly inelastic. 





be the vector of tax rates pertaining to the lower marginal income tax rate, the upper 
marginal income tax rate, the GST rate and the property tax rate respectively, our 
baseline model adopts the tax vector (20%, 33%, 12.2%, 0%)
27
                                                            
built is in fixed supply so that tax benefits arising on this part of the housing asset will be capitalised 
into land value.” 
. A 0.5% property tax 
is then introduced, with either the GST rate or the income tax rate reduced to 
compensate for the higher tax revenues.  
26 In section 5, we show that, in fiscal revenue terms, a 0.5% property tax is approximately equivalent 
to a 1% land tax. 23 
The first column of table 1 shows the outcomes for key variables in the 
model when the supply of both apartments and houses is inelastic, there are seven 
percent fewer properties than agents (ensuring 14 percent of agents share housing), 
and slightly over half of the properties are apartments. In equilibrium, the prices of 
apartments and houses are $238,600 and $394,900 respectively; since average 
incomes are $63,000, the average house price to income ratio is approximately 5.
28
In the model, 18% of agents rent, although 88% of houses are owner-
occupied since some agents share apartments
 
The annual rent of $12,550 represents a rental yield of just over 5% on the apartment 
price, which equals the return on financial assets (5%) plus a small allowance for 
rates and other housing costs.  
29
Column 2 shows the steady state outcomes for the case where all property 
is taxed at a rate of 0.5% p.a. and GST is reduced to 8.8% in order to leave the fiscal 
balance unchanged. In equilibrium rents are almost unchanged; in contrast, 
apartment and house prices both fall by approximately 10% as the present 
discounted value of the tax is impounded in the property price. Rents do not change 
because they are subject to two offsetting forces: first, the annual tax is passed on to 
renters, raising rents; but secondly, property prices fall, as competition amongst 
landlords to fill vacant houses reduces rents and house prices by an amount that 
almost exactly offsets the first effect. Indeed, these two forces are nearly equal 
because property prices fall until rents reach a level that just induces the marginal 
renter to stop sharing an apartment and rent (or purchase) a whole apartment 
. Most of the agents that rent are 
young, but 10 percent of middle aged and retired households also choose to rent. 
Home-owning households initially borrow to purchase their property resulting in a 
household gross debt ratio of 69% of GDP. Many middle aged agents hold financial 
assets, so net household financial assets are 28% of GDP.  
                                                            
27 GST is set as a residual in the model to ensure that the fiscal position is balanced. Technically, this 
leads to slight variations in the model’s GST rate from the statutory rate in some simulations 
(including the baseline); the differences are immaterial and do not affect the tenor of the results. 
28 This ratio is quite high and reflects a shortage of properties. If there are more houses, average prices 
are lower, and the home ownership rate is higher, but the changes induced by introducing a property 
tax are qualitatively similar.  
29  We focus on the “household homeownership rate”  (the fraction of houses owned by their 
occupants)  rather than the “family homeownership rate” (the fraction of independent agents owning 
their own home) since the former corresponds to the usual measure cited in policy discussion. The 
homeownership rate here is artificially high relative to the figure for the actual economy, but it is 
changes in this rate across simulations, rather than its level, that will concern us henceforth. 24 
instead. This is a level that depends on the marginal utility of housing relative to 
other goods amongst the marginal young renting agents; since the number of 
properties doesn’t change, the income level (and often the identity) of the marginal 
sharing renter doesn’t change, so that rents are little affected by property taxes. 
 The decline in house prices means gross household debt declines and net 
household financial assets increase, as less money needs to be borrowed to purchase 
a property. The rise in net financial assets allows an increase in consumption. While 
the inelastic supply means that the aggregate number of dwellings does not change, 
the homeownership rate increases slightly as a few low income middle aged agents 
decide to buy rather than rent. 
Column 3 shows the steady state outcomes when income tax rates are 
reduced when the property tax is introduced, and GST is left approximately 
unchanged. Prices of properties again impound the bulk of the present discounted 
value of the property tax, although some substitution between houses, apartments 
and goods consumption leaves house prices and to a lesser extent, apartment prices a 
little above their level in the GST case.
30
These results are broadly as expected from our partial equilibrium analysis 
given the assumption of completely inelastic supply. The debt and net financial asset 
results are particularly interesting from a macroeconomic perspective. The household 
balance sheet, inter alia, comprises property as an asset and mortgage debt as a 
liability. If a tax is introduced that lowers the value of property assets, the offset is a 
reduction in gross debt and an increase in net financial assets. At a macroeconomic 
level, debt, at the margin, is financed from offshore. Thus the steady state effect of a 
reduction in property prices (as a result of a land/property tax) is a reduction in New 
Zealand’s gross and net offshore debt and a rise in its net international investment 
position (NIIP).
 The homeownership rate again rises slightly 
relative to the baseline case as more middle aged people rent, debt levels decline and 
net financial assets of households increase. 
31
                                                            
30 Note that the reduction in GST leads to a less favourable valuation of housing relative to goods 
consumption than in the income tax reduction case. 
As a result, debt servicing costs will be reduced resulting in  a 
sustained rise in the current account balance. Put simply, high domestic property 
31 To the extent that foreigners own some of the property directly, the reduction in the value of their 
property equity in New Zealand will also lead to an initial rise in the NIIP.  25 
prices raise the portion of the country’s production that is paid annually to 
foreigners, and a policy that reduces these prices is likely to lead to an increase in net 
foreign assets and in the fraction of income available for consumption.  
While macroeconomic benefits might accrue from imposition of a 
land/property tax, it is important also to analyse welfare changes at the level of the 
individual family. Since the model is one in which agents maximise lifetime utility 
subject to constraints, we can use the utility outcome for each agent to measure 
whether utility rises or falls in each case. Furthermore, we can compare the degree of 
utility changes across the income spectrum to see how welfare changes according to 
lifetime earnings. 
Figure 1 divides agents into deciles according to lifetime incomes. It charts 
the average steady state change in utility for households in that decile, firstly for the 
GST-financed land tax (labelled G) and secondly for the income tax-financed land 
tax (labelled I). The actual levels of the utility changes need not concern us, but the 
overall utility changes are important; in addition, the differing patterns across income 
deciles when GST rather than income tax is changed are instructive.  
Every decile experiences a substantial improvement in welfare under both 
financing options. For most deciles, there is little to choose between the income tax 
or GST options, although low income agents are slightly better off if the revenue 
raised from a property tax is refunded through a cut in the GST rate rather than a cut 
in income taxes, while high income agents are better off with a cut in income tax 
rates.  The first decile records the greatest increase in welfare, although not too much 
emphasis should be placed on this latter result as much of the difference between the 
welfare improvement for the first and all other deciles reflects a change in inheritance 
patterns
32
Welfare improves primarily because house prices fall and agents spend less 
of their income on taxes and housing, and thus can afford more consumption. While 
rents and the user cost of housing (interest rate on the purchase price, plus land tax) 
. 
                                                            
32 The property tax induces some low income agents to stop renting and purchase a house in middle 
age. They stay in it in retirement and leave it as a bequest when they die. The logic and long term 
nature of the model means their parents would have also done the same, so they also inherit a house 
when middle aged.  The change in the inheritance and bequest arrangements causes a sharp increase in 
welfare.  26 
change by little when a property tax is introduced, part of this expenditure is 
collected by the Government allowing alternative taxes to be reduced. In essence, 
some of the expenditure on housing is diverted from overseas lenders to the 
government, resulting in a reduction of the country’s gross debt servicing bill. 
How is it that all deciles can benefit from the change when, by 
assumption, aggregate GDP is unchanged?  One reason is that the tax base has been 
widened to include imputed rentals, thus enabling a broader base, lower rate tax 
regime to emerge with a reduced overall excess burden caused by taxation. A 
separate cause is that initial holders of property suffer a reduction in their property 
wealth as the initial property price falls.
33
4.3  Elastic Housing Supply 
 This once-only welfare cost on a particular 
generation is reflected in a permanent welfare gain for all future generations who pay 
lower servicing costs to foreigners given the lower property values. 
We repeat the same three tax options for the case that there is an elastic 
supply for both apartments and houses. As discussed previously, this may be an 
appropriate assumption with regard to improvements (since the cost of supplying 
improvements is not directly affected by a property tax) and may be appropriate with 
respect to land if the taxation on housing land is treated differently to agricultural 
land and land can be shifted between alternative uses. The results are in Table 2. 
Some results differ substantially from those with perfectly inelastic supply. 
In particular, the elastic supply assumption means that apartment and house prices 
change by much less when the property tax is introduced compared to the inelastic 
case. Accordingly, rents rise to maintain required rental yields for landlords. This 
results in annual rents increasing to incorporate virtually the entire annual property 
tax payment. The increased tax on housing results in a decline in the number of 
properties in the economy, for under both financing options, more people share a 
flat than under the baseline case. The increase in renting is most noticeable amongst 
young households, as they substitute towards shared accommodation rather than 
their own homes in response to the increase in housing costs. Furthermore, there is a 
change in the mix of dwellings, with a substantial decline in the number of houses 
                                                            
33 Given that we are using a steady state model, this cost is not incorporated into our welfare figures. 27 
and an increase in the number of apartments. The household homeownership rate 
also falls slightly as the total user cost of property ownership including property taxes 
increases once a property tax is introduced.  
Even though prices don’t fall, the household debt ratio falls. In this case it 
is driven principally by the change in the mix of dwelling with a decline in the 
number of large houses and an increase in the number of small apartments. 
Compounding this effect, there is a small decline in the total number of properties in 
the economy due to the increased number of people sharing accommodation. 
Accordingly, net financial assets again increase. These effects are in the same 
direction, but are not as strong, as the inelastic supply case.  
Figure 2 depicts welfare changes by deciles for each financing option with 
elastic supply. The overall welfare gains are positive but the gains are less than in the 
inelastic case; seven of the ten deciles show a net welfare gain under each tax 
financing option. When GST is reduced, the strongest benefit arises for the lowest 
decile households. This group is most likely to share a house at some stage of their 
life, and the increase in rent they paid on half an apartment is more than 
compensated by the increase in purchasing power that they obtain as a result of the 
reduced GST rate.
34 Other low income deciles also benefit from a reduced GST rate. 
Higher decile households benefit most when income taxes are reduced consequent 
on the introduction of the  property tax. This result reflects our choice that the 
income tax reduction is set so that all individuals face the same percentage reduction 
in income tax payments. Thus higher income individuals gain a greater dollar 
reduction in taxes than do poorer individuals. Figure 2 indicates that it would be 
possible to design the income tax reduction so that lower (higher) decile individuals 
had a greater (lower) percentage cut in income tax payments, essentially by cutting 
the lower (upper) marginal tax rate by more (less) than the cuts that we have adopted. 
In so doing, all deciles could be made better off through imposition of a property tax 
offset by an income tax reduction.
35
                                                            
34 This result could be dependent on the utility attributed to sharing a rental property rather than 
renting it outright. Therefore not too much emphasis should be placed on this particular outcome. 
 
35 Again it should be noted that we do not account here for any productivity benefits that may accrue, 
across all income deciles, from a reduction in income taxes. 28 
The elastic supply case modelled in this sub-section may under-estimate 
the price effects and over-estimate the rent effects of a tax switch, especially if the tax 
switch were fully comprehensive and applied only to land. Nevertheless, it usefully 
indicates the direction of changes that might occur relative to the inelastic case as the 
elasticity of residential land supply increases. This may be especially relevant if a fully 
comprehensive tax were not adopted and/or if a property tax rather than a land tax 
were adopted. The elasticity will also vary according to the time period considered; 
the supply may be highly inelastic in the short-medium term but elastic in the long 
term. 
 The outcomes in the elastic and inelastic examples reflect the basic 
properties of Ramsey taxation that taxes should optimally be applied to items whose 
allocation  does not change as a result of the tax. A key issue for the welfare 
properties of a land tax is therefore the extent to which the supply of residential land 
is inelastic rather than elastic. The results in this section pertain to the two extreme 
cases. We have also simulated an intermediate case, in which the supply of large 
houses is inelastic and the supply of apartments is elastic. This case could reflect the 
situation where the supply of land in premium suburbs (perhaps those with good 
views or convenient access to city facilities) is limited, but other land, perhaps land 
on the fringes of the city, is available for residential development. In this case, a land 
tax leads to an increase in rents, little change in the price but a decline in the quantity 
of “small” houses, and a decline in the price but little change in the quantity of 
“large” houses. Lifetime welfare improves by more than the fully elastic case but less 
than the fully inelastic case. As before, the welfare gains do not just accrue to owners 
of large houses; rather, the decrease in the price of large houses results in a diversion 
of some of the total user cost of housing to the government, and these savings are 
spread around through a reduction in alternative taxes. In addition, the reduction in 
the price of large properties in this intermediate case again leads to an improvement 
in the country’s net debt position. 
5  Fiscal Impacts of a Land/Property Tax 
We use Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ) rateable values for 2006 to 
estimate the tax base upon which a land tax or a property tax could be levied in New 
Zealand. QVNZ’s rateable values already form the basis for land/property taxes that 
exist in the form of local authority rates and thus provide a statutory basis for a 29 
central government land/property tax. Currently, valuations are updated every three 
years for most local authorities. Thus using 2006 data, we have valuations for 2004, 
2005 and 2006. We set these all onto a 2006 basis by updating the 2004 and 2005 
valuations using movements in QVNZ’s national house price index through to 2006. 
House values comprise more than half of all rateable values (for both land and 
property) across New Zealand. While each class of property and each area will 
exhibit some idiosyncratic movement relative to this index, we consider that the 
resulting estimates are sufficiently accurate to assess the overall effects of the 
introduction of a new tax. 
Table 3 presents the valuation data across several categories. First, we 
present data for the total of all properties valued across New Zealand (“Total – All 
properties”). Included in this total are public buildings, public land and conservation 
forestry. It is unlikely that such properties would be subject to a land/property tax; 
thus we include a second total (“Total – ECFO”) that excludes the conservation 
forestry estate and ‘other’ properties (where the latter are mainly public buildings and 
public land). This total is then decomposed into four groups: Residential; 
Commercial Forestry; Agriculture; and Industrial/Commercial/Mining. We follow 
QVNZ’s categories in this decomposition except that we allocate “lifestyle” 
properties (both vacant and improved) to residential rather than to agriculture.
36
For each of the major categories listed above, we present data for total 
land value, total capital value (and improvements separately), the number of 
assessments (i.e. number of properties in that category), the average land value and 
capital value per assessment, and the ratio of land value to capital value for that 
category. The latter calculation is useful in judging how different sectors would be 
affected by a land tax versus a capital value tax (for a given revenue target). 
 
We provide additional information according to ownership definitions. 
We use central government accounts to obtain figures for central government owned 
land and property, and Statistics New Zealand data for local government owned 
property. The residual is attributed to private ownership. Separately, we use Te Puni 
                                                            
36 Lifestyle properties represent 13% of resulting total residential capital value and 56% of resulting 
agricultural capital value; if lifestyle properties were allocated instead to “agriculture”, they would 
comprise 36% of total agriculture value. 30 
Kokiri data to itemise the value of land under the aegis of the Maori trustee.
37 We 
also use census data to provide a pro rata estimate of residential land and property 
that is investor-occupied
38
The first two ownership categories may effectively be exempted from any 
land/property tax which is why we list their values here. We cannot deduct their 
totals directly from “Total-ECFO” since the latter has already deducted the value of 
public buildings/land and conservation forestry from “Total – All properties”. The 
deductions in that case totalled $24.9 billion (land value) and $84.1 billion (capital 
value); these deductions compare with estimated total central and local government 
holdings of $20 billion (land value) and $51.8 billion (capital value). Estimated central 
and local government holdings are therefore less than the deductions already applied 
to the Total category. We surmise that the bulk of these deductions pertain to 
government holdings and so do not make further deductions for government 
holdings from the Total-ECFO category. 
. The latter two categories are useful if consideration were 
given to exempting certain kinds of properties from a tax.  
Several key results are apparent from Table 3 (where all ratios are specified 
relative to Total-ECFO unless otherwise noted). First, Residential comprises 65% of 
all land values and 69% of all capital values. Second, if owner-occupier households 
were exempt from a tax, the tax base would shrink by approximately 41% (land 
value) or 43% (capital value). Third, while land-based industries are often regarded as 
the “backbone” of the economy, Agriculture and Commercial Forestry together 
comprise just 24% of all land value in the economy, and an even smaller percentage 
of capital values. Fourth, for both Residential and Industrial/Commercial/Mining, 
land values comprise around half of capital value; by contrast, the ratios for 
Agriculture and Commercial Forestry are around four-fifths. Thus a single rate 
proportional land value tax (with no exemptions) would fall more heavily on existing 
property owners within land-based industries. Fifth, the average Agriculture land 
value (per assessment) is over five times that for Residential, while the capital value 
                                                            
37 Other forms of Maori-owned land are not included here. However, even with a broader Maori 
ownership definition, the numbers listed in Te Puni Kokiri’s (2008) “The Maori Asset Base” relating 
to Maori property are very small relative to the aggregate values for “Total-ECFO”. 
38 The remaining housing is owned by an owner-occupier either directly or through a family trust. This 
calculation assumes that owner-occupied and investor-owned properties are, on average, of equal 
value. If owner-occupied homes average a higher value, our pro rata estimate of investor-owned 
housing will be an over-estimate. 31 
ratio is 3½ times as great. Thus, if each property was owned by a single occupying 
household, a proportionate tax would hit agricultural-based households considerably 
harder than it would hit residential households. These results suggest that 
consideration may be given (under either a land value or a capital value tax) to a 
differential rate applied to land classified as (and used as) Agriculture or Commercial 
Forestry. Alternatively, consideration may be given to a flat rate ‘deductable’ per 
hectare. 
Table 4 provides more detail on the Residential sector, being the largest 
sector in terms of property values. Slightly more than two-thirds of the value lies 
within the “residential dwelling” category that includes detached and semi-detached 
houses. The average capital valuation of each assessed property in this category is 
$380,000 compared with the average assessed value for apartments/etc at $335,000. 
Owners of lifestyle properties (with improvements) have the highest average assessed 
values at almost $600,000. The table also shows that the over 90,000 properties 
currently being held vacant (but potentially usable for residential purposes) have an 
average land value of $215,000. A land tax at 1% p.a. therefore amounts to an 
average $2,150 p.a. tax on holdings of each vacant property which may encourage the 
freeing up of such properties for development. 
Table 5 presents potential revenue figures from a hypothetical 1% p.a. 
land tax. Initially, we use the full “Total-ECFO” tax base from Table 3 based on 
2006 values. As discussed previously, the tax base may shrink as a result of such a 
tax; conversely, introduction of such a tax may not be feasible until at least 2011, so 
property values may have increased relative to 2006 by that time.
39
The third column presents estimates of the initial year land tax revenues 
both for the full Total-ECFO category and for each sector. Estimates are also 
provided on the basis that certain sectors (or sub-sectors) may be exempted. The 
fourth column presents estimates of the initial year revenues from a property tax (i.e. 
on capital values) that raises the same aggregate revenue as a 1% land tax (excluding 
 
                                                            
39 Property values continued to increase for two years after 2006, followed by some retracement. In 
June 2009, New Zealand residential section prices stood 5.2% above their June 2006 level; New 
Zealand house prices were 5.6% above their June 2006 level (source: REINZ Housing Price Index). 
We make no forecast of property movements between 2009 and 2011. The reader can easily scale 
property values and tax revenues up or down compared with those in the table to reflect their views of 
initial values. 32 
consideration of any differing movements in land values and improvements). The 
resulting capital value tax is set at 0.549%.  
Consistent with Table 3, comparison of the two revenue columns 
demonstrates that a land value tax would raise more from the commercial forestry 
and agriculture sectors than would a capital value tax, while a capital value tax would 
raise more from the industrial/ commercial/mining sectors. The residential sector, in 
aggregate, would pay similar amounts of tax in either case. (In the following section, 
however, we show that considerable differences would occur within the residential 
sector.) The complete exclusion of agriculture and forestry from either tax base 
would lose between 17% and 24% of total revenue; exclusion of owner-occupied 
residential housing would lose over 40% of revenues. Exclusion of both 
agriculture/forestry and owner-occupied housing would emasculate the tax base; 
revenues would amount to just 36% and 40% of the total potential tax base for a 
land tax or property tax respectively. 
Table 6 provides a 20 year table of estimated revenues for three different 
land tax cases.
40
The third and fourth columns relate to examples from our partial 
equilibrium discussion. Column 3 models the revenues obtained with a twenty year 
gradual introduction of the full land tax, where the initial year’s tax rate is set at 
0.05%, rising linearly in 0.05% steps each year until 2030 when the full 1% rate is 
reached. (Thus revenues in year 2030 are identical to those in the previous column, 
but revenue in earlier years is reduced.) Column 4 models the revenue implications of 
a 1% land value tax only on the increments to land value over and above the 2011 
level. Thus in the first year, no tax is collected. As inflation raises the value of land, 
 We assume that 2011 land values (after imposition of the tax) are the 
same as for 2006, and we apply the tax to all sectors within Total-ECFO. Column 1 
of the table provides the land value tax base if land inflation registered a constant rate 
of 2% p.a. The second column applies the 1% p.a. land tax to this tax base. 
                                                            
40 Property tax cases would be identical given the same assumptions and using a 0.549% capital value 
tax rate in place of the 1% land value tax rate. 33 
the tax take increases, reaching approximately one-third of the full level after twenty 
years.
41
In all calculations above, we do not separately model the effects on 
revenues of excluding Maori-trustee land from the tax base. The numbers are too 
small to result in a material change in revenues. We note, however, that any 
exemptions (e.g. for Maori-trustee land, owner-occupier housing, native bush, 
agriculture and forestry) creates incentives to reclassify lands into the exempted 
sectors. Current classification systems are designed to be resistant to such pressures, 
but pressures would increase if tax rates increased. Perhaps the most difficult 
dichotomy to police would be any differentiation between owner-occupied and other 
housing (whether for an exemption or for a differential tax rate).
 
42
6  Distributional Impacts: Community Level 
  In other 
situations, the possibility of avoidance behaviour would likely confine exemptions (if 
any) to cases where there are clear legal definitions of exempted land (e.g. QE2 
covenants for native bush, clear distinctions in law pertaining to Maori land, etc). 
Plummer (2009) documents a paucity of data on the distributional effects 
of both a land tax and a property tax (and of one relative to the other). In part, the 
difficulty in determining distributional impacts stems from having to place the 
land/property tax change in the context of an overall tax policy change in order to 
consider the combined effects  of tax changes as one package rather than as 
individual components. General equilibrium outcomes that may differ from partial 
equilibrium assessments of outcomes further complicates the task of determining 
distributional effects. In addition, a decision has to be made regarding whether to 
concentrate on initial wealth impacts of the policy change or on subsequent cash-
flow impacts. 
Internationally, one of the difficulties of judging distributional impacts of a 
land tax (combined with any other tax change) is that data on land values are often 
sketchy. New Zealand has the advantage that it already starts with a statutory basis 
                                                            
41 Given the comparatively low tax take for a 1% rate when taxing only incremental values (even 
compared to the 20 year gradual introduction case), consideration could be given to a higher tax rate 
in the incremental case if greater revenues were sought. 34 
for assessing land values in addition to capital values, and thus can analyse 
distributional considerations based on current official valuation methods. 
Initially we examine distributional impacts at the community level, where 
“community” is defined initially at the area unit (AU) level. (In section 7, we analyse 
data at the household level.) Statistics New Zealand divides New Zealand into 1,919 
AU’s which can be considered as tightly defined suburbs (for example, Manukau City 
has 91 AU’s). We use 1,733 of these AU’s (omitting AU’s that have little or no 
population such as offshore islands or inlets). We also examine results at the 
territorial local authority level (TLA), with New Zealand divided into 73 TLA’s.  
For each community (at AU and TLA level), we obtain Statistics New 
Zealand 2006 census data and QVNZ 2006 valuation data
43
-  median residential dwelling (RD) land value (MLV); 
  for the following 
variables (with shortened names in brackets): 
-  median RD improvements value (MIV); 
-  median RD capital value, i.e. land plus improvements (MCV); 
-  ratio of median RD land value to median RD capital value (MRAT);  
-  median household income (HHY); 
-  homeownership proportion (HOP).
44
These data are collected so that we can examine the cross-sectional 
relationships between dwelling values and each of household income and 
homeownership rates. We are particularly interested to test the following hypotheses 
that would indicate that a land/property tax has features reflecting a progressive tax 
outcome. Relative to a null hypothesis of no relationship, we test the alternative 
hypotheses that: 
 
                                                            
42 In order to police this distinction, one may possibly require a legally binding declaration from the 
legal owner (each year) that at least one of the legal owners lived in the house as their main residence 
for the majority of the year. This would raise the issue of whether a family trust met the criterion. 
43 Valuation data relating to 2004 and 2005 are updated to 2006 using the national house price index. 
44 I.e. the proportion of dwellings owned by at least one person living in that dwelling or by a family 
trust involving at least one resident.  35 
-  areas with high incomes have high land values per dwelling; 
-  areas with high incomes have high improvement values per dwelling; 
-  areas with high incomes have high capital values per dwelling; 
-  areas with high incomes have high land relative to capital values per 
dwelling. 
If a positive relationship is found when examining the first three 
hypotheses we can conclude, from our work in sections 3 and 4, that imposition of a 
land/property tax will, on average, affect the wealth of higher income households 
more than that of lower income households.
45
Our approach involves analysing a sequence of bivariate relationships 
since we are aiming at uncovering systematic associations between the variables. This 
approach cannot attribute causality to the relationships, but we can at least ascertain 
whether observed associations are consistent with certain hypotheses. 
 Furthermore, if land (capital) values 
rise more [less] than proportionately in relation to income, then a land (property) tax 
is progressive [regressive]. The fourth hypothesis is a test of the hypothesis that a 
land tax is more progressive (across householders) than is a property tax (McCluskey 
et al, 2006). We also examine the relationships between homeownership proportions 
and each of land values, improvement values, capital values and the land/capital 
value ratio to help infer what effects changes in these variables may have on 
homeownership prospects. 
We begin by examining the relationship between median household 
income and the housing data. The top half of Table 7 presents AU and TLA level 
estimates in which we regress each of lnMLV, lnMIV, lnMCV and MRAT against 
lnHHY plus a constant. The logarithmic specification means that coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities; MRAT is already expressed as a ratio, and accordingly we 
use the raw variable.  
                                                            
45 Strictly, this statement relies on homogeneity of outcomes within each AU (or TLA). By testing the 
relationships across two spatial scales (AU and TLA) we can examine whether the degree of 
aggregation significantly affects the results. 36 
At both AU and TLA levels, each of the value variables is positively 
related to median household income. Furthermore, at both scales, the coefficient on 
lnHHY in the land value and capital value equations is significantly greater than unity 
(using a 95% confidence interval) indicating that both taxes are progressive. The 
lnHHY coefficient is materially higher for the land value equation than for the capital 
value equation; consequently a land tax is more progressive (for households) than is a 
property tax. Consistent with this result, the coefficient on lnHHY in the MRAT 
equation is positive. Thus, in keeping with results reported by McCluskey et al using 
2001 data, higher income households tend to live in areas where houses have 
relatively high ratios of land value to capital value.  
While these results reflect the nation-wide relationships, they may be 
driven by differences that exist chiefly across TLAs (e.g. by city versus rural 
differences). We can extract this influence by estimating the AU level equations with 
the inclusion of a dummy variable (fixed effect) for each of the 73 TLAs. The 
reported slope coefficients then solely measure the relationship between the relevant 
housing variable and household income within (rather than across) TLAs.  
This set of estimates is provided in the  lower portion of the table. 
Coefficients on the income variable remain significantly positive, but are now 
significantly less than unity. In addition, lnHHY is no longer significant in the MRAT 
equation. Thus the observed relationship between the ratio of land to capital values 
and household incomes at a national level appears to be explained by a cross-TLA, 
rather than a within-TLA, relationship. 
Results for equations that regress the homeownership rate against each of 
the value variables and the ratio variable are presented in Table 8. The TLA spatial 
scale is too coarse to produce significant results. At the AU level (generally with and 
without fixed effects), the estimates imply that homeownership is higher in areas with 
high land, improvement and capital values, and lower in areas with high land to 
capital value ratios. The value results indicate that homeowners prefer to locate in 
“better” (more expensive) areas within TLAs. 
The negative relationship between homeownership and the ratio of land to 
capital values implies that homeowners tend to have a higher than average ratio of 
improvements relative to capital value than do landlords. An implication of this 37 
result is that a land value tax would, initially at least, impact more heavily on 
landlords than on owner-occupiers relative to a property tax.  
7  Distributional Impacts: Household Level 
The community level results indicate that household incomes are 
positively related to land values and capital values. We further examine these issues at 
a household level, using data from Statistics New Zealand’s 2006 wave of the Survey 
of Family Income and Expenditure (SoFIE), that includes a wealth survey 
component. SoFIE is an official longitudinal survey that is designed to be 
representative of the New Zealand population. 
The fine-grained nature of questions in SoFIE, together with the 
weighting procedures that make the responses representative of the entire 
population, makes this survey an ideal tool to examine tax impacts at a micro level. 
The SoFIE wealth survey includes data for the capital value of the household’s 
owner-occupied house in cases where someone in the household owns the house. 
Also included is the date of valuation; we update all capital values to 2006 using the 
national House Price Index, as before. Land values are not available within SoFIE, so 
our analysis here is of the relationship between property values and other variables of 
interest.
46
Our analysis begins with examination of the relationship between 
household income and the household’s tenancy status (renter
 
47 or owner-occupier) 
and, for the latter, the household’s owner-occupied property value.
48
(i)  $0  [i.e. renter];  
 Table 9 presents 
a matrix of household incomes by house value, with weights accorded to each cell. 
Household capital values are presented using the following categories (in 2006 $s):  
(ii)  ($0, $150,000]; 
                                                            
46 To the extent that land values rise more than proportionately with property values, any positive 
(negative) links between capital values and other variables will be magnified (attenuated) with regard to 
land values. 
47 All households that are not owner-occupiers are henceforth termed ‘renters’. This includes those 
“renting” from a family trust; i.e. owner-occupation status in the SoFIE analysis does not include 
people who reside in a family trust-owned home. 
48 Additional (investment or holiday) properties are considered separately. 38 
(iii)  ($150,000, $250,000]; 
(iv)  ($250,000, $350,000]; 
(v)  ($350,000, $500,000]; 
(vi)  >$500,000. 
 
Household incomes are presented by quintile, resulting in the following values: 
(i)  <$25,030;      mean:   $14,835; 
(ii)  ($25,030, $43,737);    mean:   $33,717; 
(iii)  ($43,737, $66,782);    mean:   $54,799; 
(iv)  ($66,782, $100,850);    mean:   $82,364; 
(v)  >$100,850;      mean:  $177,159. 
Each cell in the table (other than the final row) represents the proportion of 
households in that income quintile that owns a house within the relevant capital 
value category (or, if in the first column, rents a house). The final row presents the 
proportion of the population that is within that capital value category. Thus 43.2% of 
households do not live in an owner-occupied home. Of the 56.8% of households 
that are owner-occupiers, most have properties with a capital value between $150,000 
and $500,000, i.e. categories (iii)-(v). 
For the top income quintile, the proportion of homeowners in each 
category rises as house values rise, whereas for the lowest income quintile, the 
proportion of homes that is owned is most heavily weighted to houses below 
$250,000. These observations, which are consistent with the remaining data in the 
table, indicate a positive relationship between property values and household 
incomes. Hence, consistent with the AU and TLA results, the initial wealth effect 39 
and the subsequent direct cash-flow impact of a property tax will tend to be greater 
for higher income households than for lower income households.
49
The observed positive relationship between capital value of owned homes 
and household incomes is mirrored in the rental market. Table 10 divides the sample 
into three categories based on their rental status. Category (i) pays no rent; category 
(ii) pays rent of up to $6,550 p.a. while category (iii) pays annual rent above this level. 
One feature of the data is that (a weighted) 71.6% of households pay no rent. This 
exceeds the 56.8% of households that live in owner-occupied homes. One cause of 
this difference is likely to be the treatment of family trust-owned homes that do not 
charge rent to the “tenants” who live in them. 
 
Of those who pay rent, a clear gradation is found across incomes between 
those who pay “high” rents relative to those who pay low rents. The lowest income 
quintile has fewer people paying high rents than low rents; whereas this is reversed 
for the higher quintiles and the ratio of high/low rents increases as the household 
income quintile rises. Again, therefore, we find that higher income households have 
higher housing costs than do lower income households, consistent with the data 
from Table 9. 
Another way of assessing the distributional effects of a property tax is to 
examine the relationship between ownership of property and net worth (wealth) 
rather than income. This information is presented in Table 11, relating the quintiles 
of net worth to capital value (using the same capital value categories as in Table 9). 
The relationship between the two variables is stark. Over 96% of households in the 
lowest net worth quintile do not own a home. For the top net worth quintile, the 
proportion of homeowners increases in line with the capital value category. Over 
38% of that quintile own a property worth more than $500,000. By contrast, only 6% 
of the second highest net worth quintile owns a property of at least that value. The 
figures in the table indicate that a property tax would tend to be progressive, not just 
according to an income measure, but also according to a wealth measure. 
                                                            
49 Selection effects (between renting and owning) as well as the treatment of households that rent 
from family trusts as ‘renters’ means we present these results in purely descriptive terms, rather than 
as a regression relationship. 40 
Across the full (weighted) sample, 14.2% of households owns one or more 
“investment” properties (i.e. a house which is not their primary residence). 
Ownership of a second house is most concentrated in those who reside in a category 
(vi) owner-occupied house (i.e. one worth more than $500,000); 31.3% of this group 
own additional property. This reduces to 19.9% and 16.5%, 10.5% and 9.2%  for 
categories (v), (iv) (iii) and (ii) residents respectively. For owner-occupiers, the impact 
of a property tax therefore tends to rise according to the value of their primary 
residence since owners-occupiers who reside in more expensive homes also, on 
average, have higher exposures to other property assets.
50
Separately, we have examined whether there is a relationship between 
capital value categories and mortgage servicing ratios in order to examine whether a 
property tax would hit certain owners harder than others in a cash-flow sense. Of 
those who own a house, we detect no relationship between the two, indicating that 
owners of high value homes are no more (or less) likely to face cash-flow problems 
related to mortgage servicing than owners of low value homes if a property tax were 
introduced. 
 
We examine how a property tax might impact on groups of people with 
differing characteristics. Table 12 tabulates the six capital value categories against the 
number of children in a house, the ethnicity of the highest income earner in the 
household,
51 and the household’s retirement status.
52
Households with more than 3 children are under-represented in the top 
three capital value categories, and are strongly over-represented in the rental 
category. A similar, but slightly less marked, result occurs for households with 3 
children. The implication of these results is that a tax on property value will tend to 
 In each case, the proportion of 
the relevant group can be compared against the “total” proportion in that capital 
value category to see in which categories the group is over- or under-represented. 
                                                            
50 10.6% of “renters” own a non-owner-occupied property; i.e. a similar proportion to those who 
reside in category (ii) and (iii) houses. Renters have a greater likelihood of residing in an apartment 
than do house-owners; 20.0% of renters live in an apartment, compared with between 6.0% and 7.2% 
for each of categories (ii)-(iv) and just 3.7% to 4.4% for categories (v) and (vi). Thus a property tax 
would impact more on owners of  stand-alone homes than on those of apartments.  
51 In cases where the highest income earner states more than one ethnicity, the variable is prioritised 
according to the ordering: Pakeha, Maori, Pacific, Asian, Other. 
52 A “retired household” is defined as one in which at least one person reports that they are retired 
and no-one else in the household is working. All other households are included in the “not retired” 
category.  41 
impact least (in absolute terms) on larger families. However, there are two caveats: 
First, if large families live in expensive rental accommodation, they may face a 
significant cash-flow impact of a property tax through rental payments. Second, we 
cannot be sure how many of the large families live in family-trust-owned properties 
and thus be in category (i) in the table. From other information, we know that many 
households in Housing New Zealand Corporation (“state”) houses include at least 3 
children; thus it appears that neither of these caveats is likely to over-turn the 
implication that households with large numbers of children are more likely to live in 
less expensive (owned or rented) accommodation.  
“Retired” households are much more likely than other households to own 
their own property (75.9% of retired households directly own their house compared 
with 55.7% of non-retired households). They are over-represented in each of the 
ownership categories relative to the total population. Retired households are 
therefore more prone to suffering an initial capital value loss than non-retired 
households upon introduction of a property tax. Furthermore, if a property tax was 
introduced with an offsetting reduction in income taxes, many retired households 
would gain less from the offsetting income tax reduction than households who have 
members employed in the workforce. A revenue-neutral land or property tax is 
therefore likely to impact most heavily on the older property-owning population with 
benefits to the young and, possibly, also to older renters. 
The impact of a property tax on housing equity (in the capital sense) 
across age-groups is, however, more complicated. Most retired people fully own their 
own property (i.e. with no debt attached) whereas younger owners are more likely to 
have a mortgage (and their share of equity in the house will tend to reduce as the 
their age reduces). If a tax were introduced that reduced all property values by 10%, 
those who own a house without debt would lose 10%  of their housing equity 
whereas those who initially had only 10% of the equity in their home (i.e. who had a 
90% loan to value ratio) would lose their entire housing equity. In this sense, young 
homeowners would face greater losses, on average, than older  homeowners.
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53  This raises an issue that introduction of a land/property tax would reduce the collateral that 
borrowers have in a house, potentially creating riskier exposures for lenders on existing loans (but not 
on new loans made after the introduction of the tax). This is a purely transitional issue, but potentially 
a major one not just for home loans but also for loans to productive enterprises, especially in land-
based industries. 
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Conversely, in a present value sense, they would have more to gain from an 
offsetting reduction in income taxes. This illustrates that it is important also to 
consider the full life-cycle consequences of a switch in tax policy when considering 
distributional implications. 
The Maori and Pacific populations are greatly under-represented in 
ownership categories (iii) – (vi), and Pacific families are also under-represented in 
category (ii). Correspondingly, both are strongly over-represented in the rental 
category. Both populations will therefore suffer significantly less initial capital value 
loss than the rest of the population upon introduction of a land/property tax. 
Furthermore, if their rental houses are generally in low capital value areas, they will 
face smaller rental rises (in dollar terms) than renters in higher value suburbs.  
The overall effect of a switch to a property tax from other tax bases on the 
Maori/Pacific population would, however, depend on what offsetting tax changes 
were being made. For instance, a reduction solely in the top marginal tax rate may 
result in a disadvantageous outcome for these population groups, whereas a cut to 
lower marginal tax rates may result in an overall improvement. The overall tax 
incidence on particular household and population groups, and the general 
equilibrium impacts of changes on overall prices in the economy, are important 
factors to consider for all of the cases that we have examined in this section. 
8  Conclusions 
The fiscal outlook for New Zealand, while not as parlous as in many 
countries, is still such that some action on fiscal policy is required. Our focus is on 
the potential for actions on the taxation side that may involve a land tax or a property 
(capital value) tax. We examine whether significant fiscal revenues could be raised 
through such taxes. We also examine the effects of a fiscally neutral switch towards 
land/property taxes away from other tax streams. 
One reason for focusing on the potential addition of a land tax to the 
central government’s fiscal armoury is that such a tax has favourable efficiency 
properties relative to other taxation options. To a first order approximation, the 
economy’s supply of land is fixed and a tax therefore does not alter the aggregate 
allocation of this resource. Landowners must pay the tax wherever they are located 43 
and whatever the land is used for. By contrast, consumption and income taxes distort 
allocations by altering labour supply, investment and savings choices and even a poll 
tax can affect the allocation of resources via migration decisions. Unlike a land tax, a 
property tax distorts behaviour by changing the net return on improvements, so 
impacting on investment in structures and other improvements. A switch of some of 
the existing tax burden from distorting taxes to a land tax may be considered if 
improvements in allocative efficiency, and thence per capita incomes, are sought. 
A tax on land could have non-trivial effects both on aggregate fiscal 
revenues and on individual households and firms (including farms). On the fiscal 
front, using 2006 figures, we show that a 1% p.a. tax on all non-government land 
could raise approximately $4.6 billion annually (rising to $6.7 billion annually by 2030 
with 2% p.a. land inflation). To place these numbers in perspective, $4.6 billion 
represents 20% of all income tax revenue forecast for 2009/10. The top personal tax 
rate of 38% applies above an income threshold of $70,000 p.a. Total income tax 
revenue raised on those earning above this figure is forecast to be $9.8 billion for 
2009/10. If the top personal tax rate were reduced to 33%, the direct loss in income 
tax would be $491 million, which represents just 11% of the revenue from a 1% p.a. 
land tax. 
While a 1% p.a. land tax could result in significant fiscal revenues - so 
enabling material reductions in other tax rates -  it would also have other major 
effects and its impact would fall more heavily on some sectors of society than on 
others. One currently untaxed sector that it would fall on is foreign-domiciled 
owners of New Zealand property, who otherwise pay no income tax and who pay no 
GST if they do not purchase goods and services in New Zealand. A shift to a land 
tax would therefore widen the tax base not just in terms of the base of assets on 
which tax is raised but also in terms of the number of people (i.e. non-New Zealand 
residents) who become taxpayers. The tax paid by non-New Zealanders contributes a 
net benefit to the country that exists over and above any efficiency (productivity) 
benefits that might accrue from the tax shift. 
The overall effects of a switch to land/property taxes would depend both 
on what other tax changes are made at the same time (e.g. to GST or income tax) 
and on the structure of the economy (which determines general equilibrium prices 
and allocations). Our partial and general equilibrium analyses (sections 3 and 4) 44 
demonstrate that certain key parameters (e.g. housing supply elasticities) and the 
exact nature of the tax (e.g. land versus property tax, incremental versus flat tax, etc) 
will lead to different outcomes. 
We therefore cannot be definitive about the overall impacts of a 
land/property tax. Nevertheless, we can use the foregoing analysis to make some 
informed judgements about the effects of certain tax policy options under different 
circumstances. Consider the effects of a comprehensive flat land/property tax 
funded by a proportionate reduction in income taxes. In this case, with inelastic 
supply, we may expect land/property prices to fall with rents remaining broadly 
unchanged. The present discounted value of the tax is effectively reflected in the 
initial price of the land/property; rents remain broadly unaffected since the tax 
(which landlords indirectly forward to renters) is offset by the reduced rent required 
to yield a market return on the reduced initial value of the property. With elastic 
supply, rents rise since the change in supply means that prices do not fall by the full 
present discounted value of the tax while the tax is still shifted to renters. In this 
latter case, the owner-occupancy rate falls slightly as owners’ housing costs rise; in 
the former (inelastic) case, the owner-occupancy rate rises slightly as more people are 
able to afford (cheaper) houses despite the housing tax requirements. 
In all our general equilibrium simulations, aggregate indebtedness of the 
economy declines with the introduction of a land/property tax, essentially because 
New Zealanders borrow less to finance domestic property holdings. At a conceptual 
level, the value of New Zealanders’ housing assets and liabilities fall but, at the 
margin, the liabilities are sourced from foreign savers and a land/property tax 
reduces the amount of foreign capital that must be borrowed to fund domestic 
property. 
Owners of existing property would incur a loss of wealth following 
introduction of a land/property tax unless there were perfectly elastic supply. Even 
in this latter case, if the owners retained the property they would face the present 
discounted value of the future land/property tax flow (although of course they would 
also be in receipt of tax reductions from other sources). With a flat land/property 
tax, the wealth loss would be proportionate to the existing value of land/property. 
Owners of land-extensive residential properties (including lifestyle properties), farms 
and forests would be liable for the largest losses in proportion to their property 45 
holdings if a land tax were introduced (since improvements would not be taxed in 
that case). Those with no property holdings would not face an immediate wealth loss. 
The effect on their rents would depend on the supply elasticity; the less elastic is 
supply, the less that rents would rise following introduction of the tax.   
A land appears to be more progressive than a property tax; however 
overall progressivity would depend crucially on the nature of other offsetting taxation 
changes.  The retired cohort would be more likely than younger cohorts to incur a 
wealth loss (in absolute terms) given the higher initial value of their housing assets.
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Variants of a flat land tax could be envisaged if a different balance of 
outcomes was wanted. For instance, if cash-flows amongst already retired 
households was of key concern, a land tax could be levied only on the increment of 
land value above some base level or the tax could be introduced with a gradual 
increase in the tax rate over time. If the financial situation of farmers was of 
particular concern, a reduced rate on farmland (as defined by an independent body 
such as QVNZ) could be considered. Alternatively, a per hectare rebate could be 
considered which would favour land-extensive activities, such as farming and 
forestry, since land values per hectare are relatively low for these land uses. This 
approach would also assist the progressivity of a land tax across households, since 
lower income households tend to reside in properties with relatively low land values. 
Much Maori land will also have comparatively low per hectare land value. For a 
number of reasons (including maintaining the viability of the rental market) it is 
 
They would also likely face an increased overall tax burden if a land/property tax was 
matched by an income tax reduction, simply because their incomes tend to be low in 
relative terms. Younger cohorts would face reduced current and future income taxes 
that, on balance, would generally more than make up for their higher lifetime land tax 
payments. Wealth losses would tend to be concentrated more upon Pakeha and 
Asian communities than on Maori and Pacific communities given the low rates of 
homeownership amongst these latter two ethnic groups. Households with three or 
more dependent children, on average, would suffer lower wealth losses than 
households with fewer or no children given existing homeownership patterns. 
                                                            
54 However highly geared younger households may face a greater proportionate wealth loss. 46 
difficult to see blanket exemption of owner-occupied homes being a viable policy 
option. 
We have not modelled the productivity impacts of a switch away from 
income taxes to a land (or property) tax. Results from the wider tax literature
55
                                                            
55 For instance, see Kneller et al (1999) and Bleaney et al (2001). 
 
indicate that the reduction in distortions to labour supply and investment resulting 
from lower personal and company tax rates could lead to some improvement in 
labour productivity and hence per capita living standards. It appears that fiscal 
revenues can therefore be enhanced at the same time as reducing excess burdens 
caused by distortionary taxation. While these aspects favour a land tax, distributive 
aspects of such a tax will remain a central issue in considering its merits. We make no 
claims as to which distributive concerns should prevail. Instead, our empirical and 
modelling results are intended to provide assistance to policy-makers in considering 
whether certain sets of tax changes result in acceptable trade-offs in order to achieve 
the fiscal and efficiency enhancements potentially on offer. 47 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Welfare Changes by Income Decile: Inelastic Supply* 
 
* G reflects the difference in individuals’ utility between columns 2 and 1 of Table 1. 
    I reflects the difference in individuals’ utility between columns 3 and 1 of Table 1.  
    In each case, the differences are averaged across each income decile. 
 
 
Figure 2: Welfare Changes by Income Decile: Elastic Supply* 





































* G reflects the difference in individuals’ utility between columns 2 and 1 of Table 2. 
    I reflects the difference in individuals’ utility between columns 3 and 1 of Table 2.  
    In each case, the differences are averaged across each income decile. 51 









0.5% property tax 
with 
reduced GST 
0.5% property tax 
with reduced 
income tax 
Lower marginal income tax rate  20.0%  20.0%  18.2% 
Upper marginal income tax rate  33.0%  33.0%  30.1% 
GST rate  12.2%  8.8%  12.5% 
Property tax rate  0.0%  0.5%  0.5% 
       
Apartment price  $238,600  $215,100  $215,700 
House price  $394,900  $355,600  $363,400 
Rent (annual)  $12,550  $12,350  $12,350 
       
Number of dwellings/family  93.2%  93.2%  93.2% 
Fraction small properties  54%  54%  54% 
       
Fraction young agents renting  42%  42%  42% 
Fraction agents renting  18.0%  16.6%  16.3% 
Fraction houses owned by occupiers   88.0%  89.5%  89.7% 
       
Gross debt/GDP  69.0%  56.3%  53.3% 
Net financial assets/GDP   28.3%  41.8%  45.3% 
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0.5% property tax 
with 
reduced GST 
0.5% property tax 
with reduced 
income tax 
Lower marginal income tax rate  20.0%  20.0%  18.2% 
Upper marginal income tax rate  33.0%  33.0%  30.1% 
GST rate  12.3%  9.0%  12.6% 
Property tax rate  0.0%  0.5%  0.5% 
       
Apartment price  $225,300  $221,700  $222,000 
House price  $384,500  $376,100  $378,000 
Rent (annual)  $11,850  $12,800  $12,700 
       
Number of dwellings/family  93.9%  92.4%  92.5% 
Fraction houses small  54.5%  60.2%  58.2% 
       
Fraction young agents renting   39%  47%  46% 
Fraction agents renting  15.4%  17.2%  18.3% 
Fraction houses owned by occupiers   90.0%  89.7%  88.3% 
       
Gross debt/GDP  60.3%  55.0%  56.9% 
Net financial assets/GDP   30.9%  38.4%  41.9% 
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Total - All properties  486.0  438.0  924.0  1826.8  0.526  0.266  0.506 
Total – ECFO*  461.1  378.9  839.9  1755.7  0.549  0.263  0.478 
Residential  298.0  280.0  578.0  1541.5  0.516  0.193  0.375 
Commercial forestry  4.3  0.8  5.1  5.0  0.841  0.860  1.022 
Agriculture  105.0  29.0  134.0  102.0  0.784  1.030  1.314 
Industrial/commercial/mining  53.5  69.5  123.0  107.2  0.435  0.499  1.148 
Memo Items               
Central government-owned  13.8  21.9  35.7  n.a  0.387     
Local government-owned  6.2  9.8  16.1  n.a  0.387     
Privately-owned  466.0  406.3  872.3  n.a  0.534     
Maori-trustee owned  0.7  0.0  0.7  n.a  1.000     
Investor-owned residential  110.0  103.0  213.0  568.2  0.516     
* ECFO = Excluding conservation forestry & ‘other’ 
   Sources:  
1.  All data in top portion of table are rateable values sourced from Quotable Value New Zealand; 2004 and 2005 rateable values are rated upwards to 2006 by the national 
house price index. Minor rounding may affect totals. 
a.  Lifestyle properties (vacant and improved) are attributed to residential rather than agriculture. (Total capital value of lifestyle properties is $75.2 billion.) 
b.  ‘Other’ in ECFO includes public buildings, land etc; so overlaps with central & local government-owned memo items. 
c.  Conservation forestry in ECFO has capital value of $2.1 billion. 
d.  Investor-owned residential is a pro rata estimate based on the proportion of houses where no resident owns the house directly or through a family trust (using 2006 
census data). 
2.  Central government-owned data are sourced from "Financial Statements of the Government of New Zealand” (2007). 
3.  Local government-owned capital values are sourced from "Individual local authority statistics, balance sheet items and capital transactions, year ended June" (Statistics 
NZ); land values are calculated using the same ratio as for central government.   
4.  Maori-trustee owned data sourced from Te Puni Kokiri: "The Maori Asset Base" (2008) pertaining to 2005/06. 
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No. of Assessments 
(’000) 
Average Capital Value per 
Assessment ($) 
Residential vacant  19.5  90.9  214599 
Residential dwelling  397.0  1044.9  379943 
Apartments, flats, home/income, etc  85.7  255.8  335231 
Lifestyle vacant  13.1  45.7  286671 
Lifestyle with improvements  62.1  104.3  595541 
Total Residential  577.4  1541.5  374596 
Source: Quotable Value New Zealand. 55 










Value  Capital Value 
LV Flat Tax 
@1%p.a. 
CV Flat Tax 
@0.549%p.a. 
Residential  298.0  578.0  2.980  3.173 
Commercial forestry  4.3  5.1  0.043  0.028 
Agriculture  105.0  134.0  1.050  0.736 
Industrial/commercial/mining  53.5  123.0  0.535  0.675 
Total - ECFO  461.1  839.9  4.611  4.611 
Total - ECFO excl. agriculture & forestry (A&F)  351.8  700.8  3.518  3.847 
Total - ECFO excl. owner-occ. residential (OOR)  273.1  474.9  2.731  2.607 
Total - ECFO excl. A&F and OOR  163.8  335.8  1.638  1.844 
* No account is taken here of potential drops in the value of the tax base caused by the imposition of a land or property tax, or of potential increases in values between 2006 and 
year of introduction (see section 5 for further discussion). Given that a flat tax is modelled, the revenue figures scale linearly to the tax base; thus an X% change in the tax base 
corresponds to an X% change in tax revenue. 
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Table 6: Fiscal Tracks with Alternative Tax Designs* 
 
Year  Land Value 
(with 2% p.a.  
inflation) 




20 Year Graduated 
Land Tax Introduction  
Revenue from 1% 
Incremental  
Land Tax 
2011  461.1  4.611  0.231  0.000 
2012  470.3  4.703  0.470  0.092 
2013  479.7  4.797  0.720  0.186 
2014  489.3  4.893  0.979  0.282 
2015  499.1  4.991  1.248  0.380 
2016  509.1  5.091  1.527  0.480 
2017  519.3  5.193  1.817  0.582 
2018  529.6  5.296  2.119  0.686 
2019  540.2  5.402  2.431  0.791 
2020  551.0  5.510  2.755  0.900 
2021  562.1  5.621  3.091  1.010 
2022  573.3  5.733  3.440  1.122 
2023  584.8  5.848  3.801  1.237 
2024  596.5  5.965  4.175  1.354 
2025  608.4  6.084  4.563  1.473 
2026  620.6  6.206  4.964  1.595 
2027  633.0  6.330  5.380  1.719 
2028  645.6  6.456  5.811  1.845 
2029  658.5  6.585  6.256  1.975 
2030  671.7  6.717  6.717  2.106 
*All expressed in NZ$ billion (annual revenues). Notional start date assumed to be 2011, based on 2006 values (similar comments apply about the tax base as apply to Table 5). 
Equivalent revenues could be earned with a 0.549% (capital value) property tax in place of a 1% land tax (under the same assumptions). 57 
Table 7: Relationship of Household Income to Housing Variables* 
 
  Explanatory Variable in each case is lnHHY 
Spatial Level:  AU  TLA 
Dependent Variable**  lnMLV  lnMIV  lnMCV  MRAT  lnMLV  lnMIV  lnMCV  MRAT 
Coefficient  1.650  0.8564  1.115  0.1472  2.689  1.094  1.600  0.2966 
t-statistic  21.27  32.35  29.86  12.55  5.36  7.69  7.03  3.88 
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
N  1733  1733  1733  1733  73  73  73  73 
R
2  0.2072  0.3768  0.3400  0.0834  0.2882  0.4546  0.4107  0.1753 
                 
With TLA fixed effects                 
Coefficient  0.7565  0.6966  0.7048  -0.0024         
t-statistic  11.52  26.15  21.49  -0.23         
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.8164         
N  1733  1733  1733  1733         
R
2  0.9965  0.9995  0.9993  0.9367         
*Definitions: 
  AU    = Area Unit  
  TLA   = Territorial Local Authority 
  HHY   = median household income of the community (Current 2006 $s) 
  MLV   = median land value of residential dwellings in the community (Current 2006 $s) 
  MIV   = median improvement value of residential dwellings in the community (Current 2006 $s) 
  MCV   = median capital value of residential dwellings in the community (Current 2006 $s) 
  MRAT  = median land value/capital value ratio for residential dwellings in the community 
** For the top portion of the table, a constant is included in each equation but not reported. TLA fixed effects are included in the lower portion. 
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Table 8: Relationship of Homeownership Rate to Housing Variables* 
 
  Dependent Variable in each case is HOP 
Spatial Level:  AU  TLA 
Explanatory Variable**  lnMLV  lnMIV  lnMCV  MRAT  lnMLV  lnMIV  lnMCV  MRAT 
Coefficient  0.0016  0.0821  0.0260  -0.1234  0.0041  0.0286  0.0055  0.0038 
t-statistic  0.55  11.1  4.68  -5.95  0.58  1.32  0.39  0.08 
p-value  0.5806  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.5628  0.1918  0.6985  0.9401 
N  1733  1733  1733  1733  73  73  73  73 
R
2  0.0002  0.0665  0.0125  0.0200  0.0047  0.0239  0.0021  0.0001 
                 
With TLA fixed effects                 
Coefficient  0.0330  0.1691  0.1153  -0.0546         
t-statistic  7.40  19.16  14.72  -1.83         
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0669         
N  1733  1733  1733  1733         
R
2  0.9616  0.9675  0.9649  0.9604         
*Definitions: 
  AU    = Area Unit  
  TLA   = Territorial Local Authority 
  HOP   = homeownership proportion of the community (including family trusts) 
  MLV   = median land value of residential dwellings in the community (Current 2006 $s) 
  MIV   = median improvement value of residential dwellings in the community (Current 2006 $s) 
  MCV   = median capital value of residential dwellings in the community (Current 2006 $s) 
  MRAT  = median land value/capital value ratio for residential dwellings in the community 
** For the top portion of the table, a constant is included in each equation but not reported. TLA fixed effects are included in the lower portion. 59 
Table 9: Household Incomes (HY) and Household Tenancy Status/Owner-Occupied Capital Values (CV’s)* 
 
HY quintile  Capital Value Category 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
(i)  0.564  0.130  0.143  0.080  0.056  0.029 
(ii)  0.486  0.119  0.152  0.109  0.083  0.050 
(iii)  0.436  0.088  0.172  0.147  0.092  0.065 
(iv)  0.344  0.065  0.159  0.176  0.165  0.091 
(v)  0.331  0.028  0.075  0.140  0.210  0.215 
Total  0.432  0.086  0.140  0.131  0.121  0.090 
* Weight shown in each cell (other than the last row) is proportion of that income quintile falling in the capital value category shown.  
   E.g. 15.2% of households in quintile 2 (of household income) own a house valued between $150,000 and $250,000. 
   Weight shown in final row is proportion of population within that capital value category (thus 43.2% of the sample do not live in an owner-occupied house). 
   HY quintiles given by: 
(i)  <$25,030;      mean:   $14,835; 
(ii)  ($25,030, $43,737);    mean:   $33,717; 
(iii)  ($43,737, $66,782);    mean:   $54,799; 
(iv)  ($66,782, $100,850);    mean:   $82,364; 
(v)  >$100,850;      mean: $177,159. 
   Capital Value categories given by: 
(i)  $0   [i.e. renter];  
(ii)  ($0, $150,000]; 
(iii)  ($150,000, $250,000]; 
(iv)  ($250,000, $350,000]; 
(v)  ($350,000, $500,000]; 
(vi)  >$500,000. 
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Table 10: Household Incomes (HY) and Annual Rents (RENT)* 
 
HY quintile  Rent category  Ratio 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iii)/(ii) 
(i)  0.591  0.218  0.193  0.884 
(ii)  0.619  0.112  0.267  2.384 
(iii)  0.703  0.057  0.240  4.173 
(iv)  0.772  0.029  0.199  6.804 
(v)  0.892  0.008  0.100  12.769 
Total  0.716  0.085  0.200  2.352 
* Weight shown in each cell (other than the last row) is proportion of that income quintile falling in the rent category shown.  
   E.g. 21.8% of households in quintile 1 (of household income) pay rent of between $500 and $6,550 p.a. 
   Weight shown in final row is proportion of population within that rent category (except last line which is ratio of (iii)/(ii) for full population). 
 
   HY quintiles: see Table 9. 
 
   Rent categories given by: 
(i)  0   [i.e. homeowner or in rent-free accommodation – possibly including family trust-owned home) 
(ii)  $500 - $6,550 p.a.    mean:    $4,276 
(iii)  >$6,550      mean:  $13,201 
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Table 11: Household Net Worth (NW) and Tenancy Status/Owner-Occupied Capital Values* 
NW quintile  Capital Value Category 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
(i)  0.962  0.021  0.011  0.006  0.000  0.000 
(ii)  0.657  0.179  0.107  0.042  0.014  0.000 
(iii)  0.214  0.178  0.359  0.174  0.071  0.005 
(iv)  0.138  0.037  0.171  0.306  0.287  0.062 
(v)  0.191  0.016  0.052  0.125  0.233  0.382 
Total  0.432  0.086  0.140  0.131  0.121  0.090 
* Weight shown in each cell (other than the last row) is proportion of that net worth quintile falling in the capital value category shown.  
   E.g. 96.2% of households in quintile 1 of net worth are renters. 
 
   Capital Value categories: see Table 9. 
 
   Net worth quintiles given by: 
(i)  <$34,045      mean:        $3,441; 
(ii)  $34,045 - $154,395    mean:      $87,043; 
(iii)  $154,396 - $318,400    mean:    $233,486; 
(iv)  $318,401 - $596,100    mean:    $438,850; 
(v)  >$596,100      mean: $1,461,403. 
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Table 12: Household Characteristics and Tenancy Status/Owner-Occupied Capital Values* 
Household 
Characteristics 
Capital Value Category 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
0 children  0.421  0.092  0.144  0.132  0.118  0.093 
1 child  0.462  0.073  0.126  0.126  0.134  0.079 
2 children  0.426  0.072  0.132  0.139  0.145  0.087 
3 children  0.507  0.055  0.128  0.121  0.104  0.085 
>3 children  0.598  0.083  0.137  0.050  0.058  0.075 
             
Not retired  0.443  0.085  0.138  0.129  0.117  0.088 
Retired  0.241  0.105  0.176  0.167  0.196  0.116 
             
European  0.398  0.083  0.149  0.141  0.129  0.100 
Maori  0.609  0.152  0.098  0.075  0.043  0.023 
Pacific  0.713  0.048  0.106  0.065  0.035  0.032 
Asian  0.465  0.037  0.116  0.107  0.176  0.098 
Other  0.501  0.067  0.072  0.125  0.162  0.072 
             
Total  0.432  0.086  0.140  0.131  0.121  0.090 
* Weight shown in each cell is proportion of households with that characteristic falling in the capital value category shown.  
   E.g. 24.1% of retired households are renters. 
 
   Capital Value categories: see Table 9. 
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